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The current study explores the role of selection in predicting workplace safety 
using an applied sample of applicants and incumbents in a grocery store chain located in 
the Southeastern United States. Namely, both personality-based and overt selection 
assessments, a distinction drawn from the integrity testing literature, were used to predict 
on-the-job safety performance and safety outcomes. Both types of assessments were 
hypothesized to predict two forms of safety performance (compliance and participation), 
which, in turn, were expected to predict both objective (i.e., work days missed, restricted 
work days, and micro-accidents) and subjective (i.e., near-miss, minor injuries, and 
musculoskeletal pain) safety outcomes.  
The mediated relationships (personality-based and overt variables predicting 
safety outcomes through safety performance) could not be tested with objective safety 
outcomes as the dependent variables due to low sample size. When the subjective 
outcomes were the dependent variables, this hypothesis was only supported when MSK 
pain was the outcome; indirect relationships with minor injuries or near-misses as the 
dependent variables were not significant. None of the direct relationships between the 
personality variables and the safety outcomes were significant. The second set of 
hypotheses proposed the same mediated relationships with the two overt safety variables 
as the predictors. Neither direct nor indirect hypothesized relationships reached statistical 
significance. 
The hypothesized relationships between the selection assessments and safety 
performance were also theorized to be moderated by safety climate strength, which is the 
iii 
 
degree to which employees view the company and its practices and policies similarly 
(Siehl & Martin, 1990). A strong climate was expected to weaken the predictor-mediator 
relationship because strong situations, which provide many cues about how to behave, 
decrease individual discretion and foster behavioral homogeneity (Hattrup & Jackson, 
1996; Meyer, Dalal & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1977).  
The results of these hypothesis tests indicated that the interaction between any of 
the personality variables with safety climate strength did not uniquely predict safety 
performance. Likewise, the interaction between both overt safety variables and safety 
climate strength did not significantly predict safety performance. 
Exploratory analyses suggested that average safety climate was a strong predictor 
of safety performance, accounting for over 39% of the variance in this outcome after 
controlling for demographics and group membership. Further, safety climate strength was 
also significantly related to safety performance above and beyond the effects of safety 
climate average. Safety performance and average safety climate were predictive of all 
subjective safety outcomes (near-misses, minor injuries, and MSK pain). Limitations and 
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Workplace safety is an extremely important issue in the United States. U.S. 
employees experienced over 3.2 million non-fatal injuries and illnesses in the workplace 
in 2009, almost a third of which required missing days of work; moreover 4,500 
employees lost their lives on the job (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Similarly 
disturbing statistics regarding the frequency of occupational accidents and injuries have 
been recorded in other countries as well (Zohar, 2000). The Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration (OSHA) estimates that occupational illnesses and injuries cost 
businesses $170 billion a year (OSHA, 2002), and individual companies bear the brunt of 
the expenditures associated with workplace safety incidents. Along with direct costs such 
as workers’ compensation payouts, medical charges, legal fees, and increases in 
insurance premiums, indirect costs such as lost production and productivity and 
diminished employee morale can take a financial toll on an organization (OSHA, 2002).  
These risks are not limited to certain dangerous industries. Forcier et al. (2001) explained 
that employees in any given job can be exposed to environmental (e.g., heavy machinery, 
slippery floors) or situational (driving, heavy lifting, etc.) hazards; consequently, many 
companies maintain accident prevention on their list of priorities. 
Despite advances in technology and increased monitoring of work sites, which are 
the traditional approaches to accident prevention, occupational safety incidents continue 
to occur in the workplace, suggesting that other elements are affecting these events 




prominent cause for industrial accidents (Kamp, 1994; Reason, 1990). Zohar (2000) has 
also found evidence to support the notion that unsafe behaviors exhibited by employees 
have a much greater effect on safety outcomes than unsafe conditions. The author found 
that subunit injury records were not linked to the amount of risk in the unit; rather, the 
climate for safety was the antecedent of injuries (to be discussed in detail below).  This 
also demonstrated the impact that organization-level factors have in determining 
occupational safety incidents. Blame for industrial accidents does not fall solely on the 
shoulders of employees; rather, managerial as well as broader organizational factors are 
also contributing influences (Reason, 1997). Researchers are now extending their 
perspective on occupational accidents and injuries to incorporate the idea that individuals 
at all levels of an organization, along with situational factors within the company, interact 
to affect safety outcomes (Vrendenburgh, 2002). This view is aligned with the 
interactionist approach, which recognizes the role that both individuals and their 
environment play in producing outcomes (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).  
One of the main variables that has arisen from this school of thought is safety 
climate, which is defined as employee perceptions of organizational policies, procedures, 
and practices pertaining to safety (Zohar, 2003). Safety climate has been described as a 
critical component in determining workplace safety (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 
2010); it has also been labeled as an important construct in research, because it "describes 
a key intersection between organizational and psychological processes and their 
relationship with safety" (Neal & Griffin, 2004, p.30). Recent meta-analyses have 




predictive of fewer occupational injuries than workplaces without this climate in place 
(e.g., Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006a).  
Use of Human Resource Practices to Reduce Safety Incidents 
Safety research has demonstrated that organizations can benefit financially from 
taking proactive measures to prevent safety incidents, incurring fewer expenses related to 
lost time and workers’ compensation costs (Vrendenburgh, 2002). For example, in 
addition to focusing on organizational-level variables like safety climate, businesses can 
also try to decrease occupational accidents and injuries by selecting people that are the 
least predisposed to behaving dangerously. Vrendenburgh (2002) found that out of six 
management practices (management commitment, rewards, communication and 
feedback, selection, training, and participation) examined in 62 hospitals, selection was 
the most important in terms of predicting employee injury rates. Specifically, the author 
determined that the use of proactive practices (anticipating problems to head them off 
before they occur) such as selection and training of new personnel differentiated low-
injury hospitals from high-injury hospitals. Given the fact that reactive behaviors (fixing 
problems that have already occurred) are insufficient for preventing injuries, a greater 
emphasis in safety literature should be placed on selection.  
Other researchers have started to take note of the fact that organizational leaders 
should be using selection more frequently to optimize safety, as it is not currently highly 
utilized (Lauver, 2007; Wallace & Chen, 2006). In fact, the selection process has been 
deemed the “first line of defense an organization has against hiring unsafe workers” 




can be screened out or placed into positions fraught with fewer risks (Forcier et al., 
2001). Moreover, once an organization establishes itself as a safety-conscious workplace, 
candidates who are inclined to work safely should be drawn to this organization due to 
their shared values, further developing a culture of safety (Vrendenburgh, 2002).  
A greater emphasis on proactive measures such as selection of safety-inclined 
applicants is especially important because these measures can save a business a great deal 
of money in the long term. This may especially be important in industries where profit 
margins are typically very slim, such as retail grocery. The fact that the accident- and 
injury-related costs are so large implies there is a great deal of potential for improvement 
(Clarke & Robertson, 1998). Safety-management systems can reduce up to 40 percent of 
accidents and save hundreds of thousands of dollars (OSHA, 2002). A news release from 
insurance company Liberty Mutual found that productivity was the most frequently-cited 
benefit of an effective safety program at work in a survey of 231 financial executives, 
followed by reduced costs (Liberty Mutual Group, 2005). Decreased safety-related 
expenditures are therefore a benefit that could be realized above and beyond the physical 
and mental toll on employees.   
Despite the clear advantages to using human resource management (HRM) 
practices such as selection to predict occupational accidents and injuries, there is only a 
small amount of research that specifically investigates practical HRM strategies to 
improve safety. The lack of specific guidelines for the improvement of a climate for 
safety and ensuing safety-related behavior has been identified as a major limitation of 




that organizations can benefit directly by emphasizing safety-related HRM practices 
because the implementation of these practices communicates the importance of safety to 
employees, which should orient their actions to behave in a safer manner. Thus, the 
inclusion of safety climate and selection measures in the current study allows an 
investigation of the organizational- and individual-level factors that have been linked to 
occupational injuries and accidents. This approach assumes that safety cannot be 
optimized in organizations unless companies aim to predict which employees will behave 
in the safest manner, and under what conditions this behavior is facilitated.  
This approach is imperative, as both person-related and situation-related factors 
have been linked to workplace safety (Christian et al. 2009). Christian and colleagues 
(2009) stated that an examination of antecedents of safety using the person-situation 
interaction approach is an underexplored research avenue. The authors went on to explain 
that many studies regarding safety antecedents fail to incorporate both individual 
differences and contextual factors in the same study, typically choosing to include one or 
the other. This deficit restricts a full understanding of the “unique or combined influences 
of person and situational variables" (Wallace & Chen, 2006, p. 530). The use of both the 
employee and the environment as predictors of workplace safety is important, as work 
accidents have been stated to be the result of a complex interaction between the two 





Gaps in the Safety Literature Addressed by the Current Study  
The present study proposed that group-level safety climate strength, or the extent 
of group agreement of climate perceptions, would moderate the relationship between two 
types of selection measures and safety performance (González-Romá, et al., 2002). The 
selection measures were both intended to identify an applicant who is predisposed to 
behaving unsafely; one measure attempted to tap this by asking personality-oriented 
questions, while the other directly questioned the applicant about his or her safety 
behavior. This distinction is drawn from the integrity testing literature, which 
distinguishes between personality-based and overt assessments to predict an applicant’s 
honesty and likelihood to engage in counterproductive behaviors. The safety-oriented 
selection measures were hypothesized to relate to safety performance. Safety 
performance, which is comprised of safety participation and compliance, has been 
consistently supported as a proximal antecedent to safety outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2006b; 
Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001). Therefore, the present study included this 
variable as a mediator of the relationship between the safety selection measures and 
safety outcomes. Safety outcomes were operationalized in the present study as accidents 
and injuries on the job, as measured by both objective and self-reported outcome 
measures (see Figure 1 for the full model). 
The current study addresses a series of gaps in the current body of safety 
literature. Firstly, safety itself had been largely disregarded in mainstream management 
and organizational behavior research until relatively recently, despite the major 




Wilpert, 1999). Secondly, the current study uses a multilevel theoretical perspective to 
investigate the antecedents of workplace safety, which research to date has not 
traditionally employed (Burke & Signal, 2010). Wallace and Chen (2006) noted that the 
safety literature is especially deficient in multilevel studies that incorporate both personal 
and situational antecedents. The strength of safety climate has also been suggested as a 
possible moderator of the relationship between safety climate and injuries but has yet 
been included in such a study (Beus et al., 2010). This study addresses both of these 
deficiencies by investigating whether the relationship between safety-relevant personality 
traits and safety performance is moderated by safety climate strength at the group level.  
The use of safety climate strength, as opposed to mean ratings of safety climate, is 
addressing a research deficiency in and of itself, as “very little research actually treats the 
degree of ‘sharedness’ of these perceptions as being a property of safety climate worthy 
of analysis” (Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas, 2010, p. 1110). The use of climate strength 
extends the current literature, which has already established consistently linked mean 
safety climate ratings to safety behaviors/ performance (e.g., Cooper & Philips, 2004; 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) as well as with actual injuries (e.g., Fullarton & Stokes, 
2007) and accidents (e.g., Zohar, 2002). Climate strength, however, has been relatively 
unexplored, with even fewer studies including this variable as a moderator; the current 
study addresses this by examining safety climate strength as a moderator of the 
relationship between safety-relevant personality constructs and safety performance (i.e., 




provides a better framework for the investigation of cross-level effects, which climate 
research has traditionally lacked until recently (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). 
The current study also introduces a novel component by extending the distinction 
between overt and personality-based items as used in the integrity literature to 
investigation of safety. The goal of this distinction was to examine the predictive ability 
of overt vs. covert items, in an effort to guide the inclusion of safety-related items in pre-
employment assessments.  
The following chapter provides a review of the safety literature, beginning with 
an explanation of how safety climate arises from broader organizational culture. The 
history of safety climate research will be presented, and the way in which climate forms 
into a multilevel construct, primarily due to subunit supervisors, will be explained. Next, 
a distinction between two types of safety performance will be made (safety compliance 
and safety participation), and will detail a history of research that includes this construct. 
Research supporting the predictive validity of safety climate will be detailed. Next, the 
construct of safety climate strength will be introduced and proposed as a moderator in the 
present study. Then, the novel distinction of personality-based versus overt self-report 
safety items for the purpose of personnel selection will be described, and will include 
benefits and drawbacks associated with each type of test. Next, a description of three 
specific personality constructs that are expected to act as distal predictors of safety 
outcomes will be given, followed by a description of what the overt safety measures for 




The third chapter will detail the method for the present study, including the 
participants, procedure, and design. Justification for each measure and the level at which 
it will be examined will be also provided in this section. Results of hypothesized 
relationships as well as exploratory analyses can be found in the third chapter. Finally, 
chapter four details the limitations and strengths of the current study, as well as the 








Organizational Culture and Climate 
In order to understand safety climate, it must be described within the broader 
context of organizational climate, which is a manifestation of organizational culture 
(Guldenmund, 2000). In short, organizational culture has been defined as a series of 
assumptions that a group shares, which serve to guide employees regarding how to 
perceive their work environment (Schein, 1992). Culture provides a frame of reference to 
employees to deliver information about what is acceptable and expected in their work 
environment (Guldenmund, 2000). It also serves to create a sense of identity for members 
of an organization and can foster a feeling of being a part of something larger than 
oneself. The positive aspects of these factors have been found to foster organizational 
commitment and serve to motivate employees (Wiegmann et al., 2004). 
Organizational culture and climate share a few key characteristics; in a review of 
safety culture theory and research, Guldenmund (2000) explained that they are both 
learned, stable, functional, and multi-dimensional constructs that are shared by groups of 
people. However, they are not one in the same; simply put, organizational climate is the 
manifestation or outcome of organizational culture (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003). 
Organizational culture refers to basic shared assumptions and values, whereas 
organizational climate is the “overall meaning organizational members assign to a 




Schneider (1975; 1983) explained that a distinguishing feature of organizational 
climates is shared perceptions, which are an agreement between employees about the 
practices and procedures of an organization. As such, according to Reichers and 
Schneider (1990), organizational climate pertains to the “shared perceptions of the way 
things are around here” (p. 22) as opposed to the ideal or desired way things should be 
(Dickson, Resick, & Hanges, 2006). 
Organizational Climate as Distinct from Psychological Climate 
Because climate can be conceptualized at both the psychological and 
organizational levels, it is important to distinguish them from each other, as a construct’s 
effects on other variables can differ across levels. Namely, psychological climate refers to 
individuals’ perceptions about an organization’s policies, procedures, and practices, while 
organizational climate is the aggregation of these climate perceptions (Ostroff et al. 2003; 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Thus, organizational climate perceptions constitute a higher- 
level construct.  
Schneider and colleagues (e.g., Schneider & Bowen, 1993; Schneider, Bowen, 
Ehrhart, & Holcombe, 2000) have stated that there are two forms of climate: foundation 
and specific. The former refers to “shared perceptions for larger more encompassing 
environments and related phenomena (i.e., overall climate)” (Wallace & Chen, 2006, p. 
538), whereas a specific climate pertains to shared perceptions about specific dimensions 
or areas of interest (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Wallace & Chen, 2006). For example, 




innovation (Anderson & West, 1998). The focus of the present review is on the specific 
climate for safety.  
An investigation of a specific climate for safety is more valuable than looking at a 
general organizational climate for the purpose of predicting accidents and injuries, as 
safety performance can be more accurately predicted by safety climate than general 
organizational climate. This was demonstrated by Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000), who 
found that the organizational climate- safety performance relationship was non-
significant after partialling out the effects of safety climate. Safety climate is also 
advantageous over organizational climate when considering predictors of safety 
outcomes because it has recently been determined to be a multilevel construct, while 
organizational climate is typically analyzed at a single level (Zohar, 2006). In contrast, 
safety climate considers organization-level and sub-unit-level factors. As Zohar (2006) 
noted, investigating safety climate as a multilevel construct not only reduces conceptual 
ambiguity, but also allows organizations to use a single climate score to differentiate 
individual supervisors’ priorities from organizational priorities instituted by upper 
management. 
The following section will provide a history of safety climate research and will 
provide a more complete definition for the construct. It will also detail how climate forms 
into levels and provide evidence to support the notion that multilevel formation is 






The history of safety climate research. Weigman and Von Thaden (2007) 
explained that the investigation into the root of accident causation has progressed through 
four stages throughout the years. Researchers first began theorizing about the origin of 
accidents during what has been deemed the technical period, where accidents were 
primarily blamed on equipment and mechanical failure. Following the technical period 
was the period of human error, where people began to realize the limitations of workers 
and started to shift their focus from the mechanics of equipment to the individual 
involved in the accident. The sociotechnical period followed, characterized by a focus on 
human-technology interactions and bringing forth an interest in ergonomics and system 
design. The most recent stage is the period of safety culture, which recognizes the fact 
that employees do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they interact within their 
organizational environment and culture.  
Although the construct of safety climate has been studied as early as the early 
1950’s with Keenan et al.’s (1951) investigation into the safety climate of an automotive 
plant, the safety culture period was spurred by major incidents that began to reshape 
social views on safety (Guldenmund, 2000). For example, a “poor safety culture” was 
identified as a contributing factor to the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in 1986 (Mearns & 
Flin, 1999). The understanding that safety culture is important across many industries and 
organizations, along with the predictive validity of safety culture, has spurred interest in 




Cooper and Philips (2004) detailed the four primary directions that the last quarter 
century of safety climate research has taken, beginning with an investigation into 
psychometric measurement and the factor structure of safety climate assessments. 
Another direction has focused on antecedents of safety climate; a third has investigated 
its relationship to safety performance. Lastly, the way in which safety climate is related to 
broader organizational climate has been explored. Neal and Griffin (2004) summarized 
that safety culture research has emerged from a focus on its measurement to an 
investigation of the creation of a positive climate and the outcomes associated with it. 
The present review extends the safety climate literature by utilizing a person-situational 
interaction perspective to predict safety behavior and subsequent occupational accidents 
and injuries.  
Safety climate defined. There have been numerous definitions of safety climate, 
and with them, a divergence in opinions on the factor structure and appropriate 
measurements of the construct (for a review, see Guldenmund, 2000). However, a 
number of commonalities exist between these definitions, which include the fact that 
safety climate constitutes a psychological phenomenon,  is concerned with intangible 
issues, and  refers to a specific point in time that is subject to change (Guldenmund, 
2000).  
Although Zohar first operationalized safety climate in 1980, the author has since 
redefined safety climate to reflect additional findings by other researchers. His most 




Refers to shared perceptions among members of an 
organization with regard to aspects of the organizational 
environment that inform role behavior, that is, the extent to 
which certain facets of role behavior are rewarded and 
supported in any organization. (Zohar & Luria, 2005, p.616) 
The key influences on climate are policies, procedures, and practices that are 
actually carried out, as opposed to formalities that may or may not be enacted. This is due 
to the fact that only the former indicates an organization’s true priorities (Zohar, 2000; 
Zohar & Luria, 2005), which help guide employee behavior. These outcome expectations 
regarding safety are created through organizational norms and are the value of creating a 
strong safety climate (Ostrom et al., 1993). 
Policies and procedures are created and maintained at an organization level; 
policies refer to a company’s goals and their means to see them through, while 
procedures are the guidelines for carrying out the policies. Practices, on the other hand, 
are the implementation of policies and procedures; maintained at the workgroup level, 
individual supervisors have discretion in their practices, creating between-group variance 
in practices (Payne et al., 2009). Payne and colleagues explained that practices are 
especially important to take note of, because they guide employees’ daily behavior and 
also serve to "highlight any disconnect between what the organization claims is important 
(i.e., policies and procedures) and what organizational agents (i.e., supervisors) model as 




supervisory practices help shape safety climate because employees perceive the types of 
behaviors that are supported and rewarded and behave accordingly (Payne et al., 2009).   
The formation of climate safety and its link to accidents and injuries. Climate 
in an organization forms as employees take note of the priorities in their workplace.  For 
example, the statements made and actions carried out by managers and coworkers 
provide clues as to how highly safety is valued in the workplace. Other aspects of work, 
such as its pace and emphasis on teamwork, can help employees perceive the relative 
priority of safety compared to these other aspects. Accordingly, the alignment between 
espousals and enactments is an important part of climate formation (Zohar, 2010). Zohar 
(2010) clarified that many organizations declare that safety is a high-priority issue, yet 
when “operational demands such as production pressures or costs” arise, safety 
procedures are frequently compromised to accommodate these competing demands (p. 
1518). The disparity between words and deeds provides implicit additional clues to 
workers about the relative priority of safety, shaping their climate perceptions. This gap 
and subsequent climate perceptions should become clearer over time as patterns from 
situations emerge (Zohar, 2010).  
Climate perceptions are also theorized to arise through social interaction with 
coworkers, as employees integrate the perceptions of coworkers into their own 
(Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 2010). This proposition is supported by research 
demonstrating that social influence from interacting with others leads to changes in 
individual’s feelings and behaviors (Rashotte, 2007). Climate also develops when 




act in a manner that is aligned with this type of behavior (i.e. keeping in line with the 
climate; Jiang et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2009). Zohar (2000) explained that policies that 
diverge from rewards create inconsistencies; one example would be to reward 
productivity, albeit obtained through unsafe behaviors, while instituting safety rules.  
Climate formation is also influenced when employees notice the types of 
behaviors that are expected and supported (Payne et al., 2009). Employees notice how 
often and how quickly supervisors deal with safety-related issues at work, which allows 
them to estimate what they can expect when they behave safely or unsafely. This, in turn, 
affects motivation, creating the foundation for a positive safety climate-safety behavior 
relationship at the unit level (Zohar, 2000). It has also been suggested that employees 
who work in a safer unit may perceive that their supervisor values their welfare, and 
reciprocate by behaving safely (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). Thus, climates that 
reinforce safe behavior should lead to fewer occupational accidents and injuries than 
climates that do not (Beus et al., 2010; Neal & Griffin 2006; Zohar, 2003). 
Multilevel climate formation. As previously stated, employees form perceptions 
based on their environment and their interactions with coworkers and supervisors. 
Because organizations are typically nested into workgroups such as units, divisions, or 
departments, climate automatically develops into levels, where “the higher order factor of 
safety climate should reflect the extent to which employees believe that safety is valued 
within the organization" and “the first-order factors of safety climate should reflect 





There are multiple simultaneous processes that facilitate the formation of safety 
climate in a hierarchy. Burke and Signal (2010) pointed out that some departments may 
have more exposure to workplace hazards than others, which could contribute to variance 
in safety climate within the same organization. Furthermore, there are individual 
differences in the way that employees perceive and react to these risks, fostering the 
creation of “safety subcultures” (Burke & Signal, 2010, p. 14).  
Climate also forms into levels because managers have discretion in the policies 
and procedures they execute in individual subunits, although they are created at the 
organization-level (Zohar, 2000). Zohar (2006) elaborated that while supervisors have 
discretion in how they implement an organization’s procedures, their range of actions is 
still restricted by those company-level directives. This clarifies why group climate scores 
are not only a lower-order factor under the overarching organization-level climate, but 
why group climates are also correlated with organization-level climate (Zohar, 2006). 
Thus, safety climate can be distinguished in terms of organization-level (instituted 
company procedures and actions by top management) and group-level safety climate 
(shared perceptions of the safety-related policies, procedures, and practices of a 
company; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2006).  
 Support for the concept of safety climate as a group-level variable in addition to 
an organizational variable was established by Zohar in 2000. A total of 534 production 
workers completed a measure of safety climate, and accident/injury data were collected 
for the following five months. Zohar found that safety climate as a group-level construct 




group variance, and predictive validity. In other words, employees had cohesive 
perceptions of the climate, these perceptions varied across workgroups and also exhibited 
a positive relationship with the injury/accident data collected over the five-month period. 
This research demonstrated that sources of safety climate perceptions relate to two levels 
of analysis (organization-level and group-level); the view of safety climate as a multilevel 
construct is now widely accepted among researchers.  
The distinction between safety climate at an organization-level and at a group-
level has implications for the consequences that are associated with employee actions; 
namely, group-level behaviors occur more frequently and have more immediate results in 
comparison with organization-level (e.g., frequent feedback from supervisors; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005). These sorts of distinctions clarify why group-level constructs are arguably 
stronger predictors of outcomes such as safety performance than organization-level 
constructs (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Lingard, Cooke, and Blismas (2010) expounded that 
workers typically have much more contact with the supervisors and coworkers in their 
direct workgroup, as compared to management at the top of the organization. These 
interactions influence behavior and help not only clarify why group-level climates form 
but also why these climates are linked to behaviors. The present study focuses on group-
level safety climate and group-level safety climate strength; the latter will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
The role of the supervisor in multilevel climate formation. Although there are 
many processes that coincide to create different climates within the same company, 




multilevel climate formation. In fact, Zohar (2000) stated that safety climate as a 
multilevel construct is based on the assumption that companies create policies and 
procedures that must be executed at the level of the subunit. Supervisors have discretion 
over the policies and procedures they actually carry out and dissimilarities in terms of the 
manner in which they do so. They could also diverge from the rules due to possessing 
their own agenda.  Burke and Signal (2010) stated that supervisors may not uniformly 
convey top managements’ beliefs about the importance of safety to their respective 
workgroups, or they themselves may hold varied beliefs about the importance of safety. 
The authors elaborated that this may particularly be the case when supervisors hold 
beliefs contrary to top management about who is responsible for maintaining safety in an 
organization.  
Managers also may vary in terms of how effectively they communicate the 
relative priority of safety as well as how they respond to safety-related actions (Ford & 
Tetrick, 2011). For example, a manager who praises an employee for behaving safely or 
considers this aspect of the employee’s performance when allocating raises conveys that 
safety is a priority in the organization, more so than a manager who does not engage in 
these behaviors. Managers also play a large role in aspects of work that indirectly affect 
safety and employees’ perception of its priority, including pace of work and job training 
programs (Vrendenburgh, 2002). Zohar (2000) explained that differences in managers’ 
safety-related behaviors are inherent in organizations, because policies and procedures 
established at the top of the organization cannot guide every single situation that could 




implementation of policies, giving rise to between-group variation in perceptions of 
procedures and subsequent formation of safety climate. The role of workgroup 
supervisors, therefore, is arguably the largest contributing factor to the hierarchical nature 
of climate.  
The theory that supervisors are the main reason that climate levels and strength 
vary by group has been empirically demonstrated. Management commitment to safety 
has long been established as a major factor that determines whether an organization’s 
safety program will or will not be successful (Zohar, 1980). Research conducted by 
Simard and Marchand (1995; 1997) demonstrated that the likelihood that workgroups 
will engage in safety initiatives and comply with safety-related rules is best predicted by 
supervisory practices, while the commitment of top management only provided a small 
amount of incremental variance. Similarly, the number of safety-related behaviors and 
incidents was linked to perceptions of supervisors’ safety actions (Johnson, 2007). 
Griffin, Burley, and Neal (2000) found that changes in leadership lead to changes in 
safety climate as well as safety compliance and participation. Another study showed that 
perceived safety climate can be improved with the use of a safety-specific 
transformational leadership style (Barling et al., 2002); similarly, Zohar (2002) found 
leadership style affected injury records through safety climate. More recently, Zohar and 
Luria (2005) established that safety climate formed at the unit-level due to different 
leadership processes.  
Thus, the role of the supervisor in creating group-level safety climate and 




of management involvement and commitment to safety is further supported by the fact 
that although researchers have conceptualized safety climate as having anywhere from 
two to nine dimensions, this dimension is nearly always included. Its inclusion is intuitive 
when considering the fact that managerial support formalizes employees’ expectations of 
safety-related behavior (Ford & Tetrick, 2011; Neal & Griffin, 2004).  
This rationale supports the use of a single manager-oriented dimension to 
examine safety climate, which is the type of measure the current study employs. 
Additionally, it has been noted that the purpose of the safety climate assessment should 
be the determining factor in whether a higher-order factor is more appropriate than 
precise first-order factors, including an examination of safety climate on safety outcomes 
as a whole (Griffin & Neal, 2000). This is especially true when specific first-order factors 
that were found in a particular research study may not apply to a different work 
environment, such as the one included in the present study. Cooper and Philips (2004) 
stated that a safety climate factor should only be included if it is hypothesized to predict 
safety performance, as this is the ultimate purpose for measuring safety climate. The 
authors went on to say that it is likely that divergences in reported factor structures may 
in actuality be due to methodological differences. Thus, the current study employs a 
single-factor safety climate measure that focuses on the actions of the direct supervisor. 
The following section will review research pertaining to safety performance, which is 
comprised of safety participation and safety compliance, and is included in the present 






Safety participation and safety compliance. Safety performance refers to the 
actions or behaviors that employees carry out to support their own safety as well as that 
of their coworkers, and is typically described in terms of safety compliance and safety 
participation (Burke & Signal, 2010). These dimensions are based on Borman and 
Motowidlo’s (1993) distinction between task and contextual job performance dimensions, 
where the former is a formally mandated component of an employee’s job and the latter 
constitutes informal extra-role behaviors (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Jiang et al., 2010). 
According to Griffin and Neal (2000), safety compliance is defined as the “core safety 
activities that need to be carried out by individuals to maintain workplace safety,” (p. 
348) whereas safety participation refers to “behaviors such as participating in voluntary 
safety activities or attending safety meeting” (p. 348). Thus, whereas compliance directly 
contributes to workplace safety (e.g., wearing personal protective equipment), 
participation indirectly contributes it by creating a safety-supportive environment (e.g., 
attending safety meetings; Griffin & Neal, 2000).  
Employees who exhibit safety compliance and participation are less likely to have 
accidents and injuries at work because they are following safety rules and procedures 
(compliance) and taking proactive measures to address potential risks (participation; 
Jiang et al., 2010). Christian and colleagues (2009) emphasized the importance of 
distinguishing safety-related behaviors from their outcomes. For one, they are 
conceptually different in that safety performance behaviors are intangible, whereas 




(p. 1104). Furthermore, the relationships that other constructs have with safety 
performance and with safety outcomes are different; in fact, safety performance is 
frequently identified as a direct antecedent of safety outcomes (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 
2004). Thus, it is important to distinguish between them in empirical research. The 
outcomes traditionally linked to safety performance will be explained below.  
Outcomes of safety performance. Safety performance is commonly included in 
safety-related models as an antecedent of safety outcomes such as accidents, near misses, 
and injuries. Accidents are unintentional and undesirable occurrences which are 
frequently triggered by human errors or lapses on the part of the worker (Neal & Griffin, 
2006), and are said to be preceded by complex employee-environment interactions 
(Janicak, 1996). Near misses, on the other hand, are incidents that could have resulted in 
an injury but did not (Goldenhar et al., 2003). Near-misses can be conceptualized as 
warnings, as minor incidents in the past are said to be the foundation for subsequent ones. 
Furthermore, near-misses may only differ from actual injury-causing accidents due to 
chance or because a final trigger event is missing (Vrendenburgh, 2002).  
 The inclusion of safety performance in safety-related research is beneficial 
because it is a measurable criterion that has a closer relationship to psychological factors 
than safety outcomes (Christian et al., 2009). Accordingly, the direct prediction of safety 
performance as opposed to accidents and injuries is more precise, as accidents are by 
nature low-frequency occurrences and typically have skewed distributions (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2000). In support of this theory, safety performance as measured by 




outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2006b; Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001). A recent 
meta-analysis that included six independent effect sizes and 1,876 participants 
established that a safety performance composite (compliance and participation combined) 
has a -.31 mean corrected correlation with accidents and injuries; the findings of this 
study were strengthened by the use of structural equation modeling to test the 
researchers’ hypotheses (Christian et al., 2009). 
Safety performance is frequently examined as a mediator, linking safety outcomes 
to constructs such as safety motivation (Probst & Brubaker, 2001). To date, much of the 
safety literature supports the “theoretical modeling of the role of distal (e.g., personality) 
and more proximal antecedents (i.e., safety motivation and safety performance) to these 
outcomes" (Burke & Signal, 2010, p. 30). The incorporation of distal and proximal 
antecedents of safety outcomes along with the inclusion of safety performance has been 
noted to provide insight into the process behind workplace safety, yet remains in an early 
stage of study (Burke & Signal, 2010). Thus, the current study extended this literature by 
including the distal antecedents of personality and overt safety behavior self-reports 
along with the proximal antecedents of safety performance. Furthermore, the research 
built on person-situation interaction research by including the situational variable of 
safety climate strength along with these individual-level predictors. Now that nature of 
safety climate and safety performance has been detailed, the following section will 





The Predictive Validity of Safety Climate 
Since its introduction as a construct by Zohar in 1980, a large body of research 
has supported the predictive validity of safety climate. The first major outcome 
associated with safety climate is safe behavior, which is also frequently referred to as 
safety performance; the second major outcome is actual accidents and injuries, typically 
measured in terms of frequency. To date, numerous studies have directly linked safety 
climate with safety behaviors/ performance (e.g., Cooper & Philips, 2004; Griffin & 
Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) as well as with actual 
injuries (e.g., Fullarton & Stokes, 2007; Hoffman & Mark, 2006) and accidents (e.g., 
Mearns et al., 2003; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006; Zohar, 2002). A sampling of this 
research will be presented below. 
Johnson (2007) conducted a study with the specific purpose of investigating the 
predictive validity of safety climate. A total of 292 employees located in one of three 
manufacturing plants of the same organization completed Zohar and Luria’s (2005) 16-
item safety climate survey, in which participants respond to items regarding their 
immediate supervisors’ actions. Safety behavior was recorded at the group level over a 
five-month period by a safety professional, who completed an injury-prevention 
behavioral checklist by observing employees. Safety outcomes were operationalized as 
the frequency and severity of on-the-job injuries and were collected from OSHA records 
for the previous year.  
Upon analyzing the results, Johnson found that safety climate exhibited a strong 




observations (r = .78). Safety climate was also significantly related to injury severity (r = 
.50), which was operationalized as lost workdays due to accident involvement; these 
results suggested that fewer lost workdays were incurred with improvements in safety 
climate. Contrary to Johnson’s (2007) hypothesis, the safety climate - injury frequency 
relationship failed to reach statistical significance. However, the author was still able to 
support the hypothesis when structural equation modeling revealed that the relationship 
was significant after safe behavior was added as a mediating variable (i.e., climate affects 
safe behavior, which, in turn, affects injury frequency). He concluded that these results 
suggest that safety climate serves as a prerequisite for safe behavior, which, in turn, can 
predict injury frequency. The findings of this study were stronger than previous studies 
that linked safety climate to self- reported safe behavior (e.g., Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996) 
since the obtainment of objective outcome measures bypassed the limitation of common 
method variation.  
Additional support for the predictive validity of safety climate was provided by 
Garcia, Boix, and Conosa (2004), who conducted a study in Spain in which 734 
production workers participated. The results indicated that workers who perceived their 
environments to have low safety climates also reported that they were less likely to 
comply with safety rules in the previous three months (68% compared to 98% of their 
high safety climate counterparts). Furthermore, low safety climate employees were also 
less likely to behave safely compared to employees working in a more positive safety 
climate (21% compared to 41%), operationalized as the degree to which employees 




Another study was conducted by Clarke (2006a) that included over 17,600 
individuals across 31 studies to establish the safety compliance – safety performance 
relationship through meta-analysis. The author found safety climate was significantly 
related to safety compliance (ρ = .43) as well as safety participation (ρ = .50). Safety 
climate also had a weaker relationship with occupational accidents and injuries (ρ = -.22), 
which existed in both retrospective and prospective study designs. These findings 
indicate that individuals working in a stronger safety climate will be more inclined to 
comply and participate with safety initiatives and also have a reduced chance of being 
involved in an accident or injury at work.  
Similar results were reported a few years later in a meta-analysis conducted by 
Christian et al. (2009). Namely, safety climate was found to be related to individual-level 
compliance (ρ = .48) and participation (ρ =.59); the authors also estimated a compliance-
participation composite effect (ρ = .49). Additionally, group-level effects were found, 
with safety climate exhibiting similar relationships with compliance (ρ =.40), 
participation (ρ =.59) and the compliance-participation composite (ρ = .51). Safety 
climate also had a weak but significant negative relationship with the safety outcomes of 
occupational accidents and injuries (ρ = -.14). In terms of levels of analysis, safety 
climate generally had stronger relationships with safety performance when analyzed at 
the group and organization level than at the individual level.  
 Studies conducted by Neal and Griffin have addressed the directionality of the 
relationship that safety climate has demonstrated with safety performance and accident 




perceptions of safety climate could be the result of accidents and injuries that occur on 
the job, as opposed to serving as a prerequisite for them. In order to investigate this issue, 
Neal and Griffin (2006) conducted a longitudinal study with 135 employees in various 
positions in an Australian hospital. Participants completed self-report measures of safety 
climate and safety behavior (participation and compliance) in the second and fourth year 
of the study. Information concerning the number and type of injuries in which each work 
group was involved was retrieved from the hospital’s database for all five years of the 
study, which began in 1996 and ended in 2000.  
One of the findings of the study was group safety climate measured in the second 
year of analysis was predictive of year four safety participation (but not safety 
compliance), after controlling for negative affect. Results of the study also suggested that 
year four safety behavior was predictive of year five accidents, indicating that “changes 
in self-reported safety behavior were associated with a subsequent reduction in accidents” 
at the group level (Neal & Griffin, 2006, p. 951). The authors concluded that behavior 
precedes accidents and that reverse causation would not explain their findings.  
Another longitudinal study conducted with Swedish construction workers found 
safety climate to be predictive of self-reported safety behaviors after seven months, when 
time one safety behavior was controlled (Pousette Larsson, & Törner, 2008). Finally, 
safety climate has been predictive of other beneficial outcomes besides those associated 
with safety, including psychological well-being (Oliver, Cheyne, Tomás, & Cox, 2002), 
work stress (Morrow & Crum, 1998), and job attitudes such as organizational 




safety climate has been well-established, the related concept of safety climate strength 
will be introduced as a hypothesized moderator of the relationship between the safety 
selection measures and safety performance in the current study.  
Climate Strength 
Although the benefits of a positive safety climate have been well-established, 
climate strength, which is the extent to which group members climate perceptions agree, 
has been relatively unexplored; in fact, it has been labeled by some researchers as an 
“unattended scientific construct” (González-Romá, Peiró,  & Tordera, 2002, p. 465). 
Researchers can examine this construct by examining the variance in climate perceptions, 
as opposed to the mean of aggregated climate ratings that is traditionally examined in 
safety climate research (Dickson, Resick, & Hanges, 2006). The presence of a strong 
climate is an indication that employees view the company and its practices and policies 
similarly, and where the values espoused by the organization are manifested in employee 
behaviors (Siehl & Martin, 1990).  
Stronger climates are expected to lead to more consistent employee behaviors 
because they “reflect less ambiguity of organizational norms and practices, leading to 
more uniform perceptions and expectations among members" (Dickson, Resick, & 
Hanges, 2006, p. 352). This theory was supported by Dickson et al. (2006), who used 
data from the well-known Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
studies (i.e., Project GLOBE) that included 3,783 employees from 123 organizations (see 
House, Javidian, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002 for a review). The results of the study 




within-organization agreement of perceptions of organizational norms, policies, and 
procedures) also tended to have a weaker climate. The theory behind this construct is 
based on Mischel’s (1973) idea that ambiguous contexts determine the degree of 
situational strength in an environment. González-Romá, et al. (2002) explained that a 
large degree of variety in behavioral responses arise from weak situations because 
employees are ambiguous regarding how they should behave; in contrast, strong 
situations give rise to more uniform behaviors, since employees have similar ideas of 
what types of responses are appropriate in a given situation.  
Researchers agree that perfect agreement among group members is unlikely to 
exist (Dickson et al., 2006), and knowledge about variance in climate perceptions across 
groups can provide useful information to a company (Lindell & Brandt, 2000). For 
example, an organization may find that despite the presence of formal organizational 
safety policies and procedures, an individual supervisor is inconsistent in his or her 
implementation of them, leading to a weak safety climate (Burke & Signal, 2010). In fact, 
Zohar and Luria (2004) found that safety climate strength was predicted by the 
consistency of supervisors’ decisions. A year later, the same authors found that 
procedural coherence (consistency in following policies and procedures) predicted 
organizational climate strength, which, in turn, fostered group climate strength. The 
authors concluded that the establishment of more formal procedures limits supervisors’ 
discretionary behaviors and strengthens climate. A recent study by Lingard et al. (2010) 




be low (i.e., safety is a low priority), whereas strong climates were more likely to be high 
(Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas, 2010). 
Climate strength has been increasingly accepted as a scientific construct due to its 
alignment with Chan’s (1998) typology of composition models. Of the five models Chan 
proposed, climate research typically involves the direct consensus model, which refers to 
within-unit agreement. González-Romá et al. (2002) clarified that “in dispersion models, 
within-unit agreement is used as the operationalization of a unit-level construct” and go 
on to point out that constructs of this nature infrequently appear in organizational 
literature (p. 465). This diverges from other models because the degree of within-unit 
agreement serves as its own focal construct, as opposed to a prerequisite for aggregating 
climate perceptions to a higher level (González-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002).  
The conceptualization of safety climate as a construct that can not only be 
positive or negative, but can also be strong or weak, is fitting with the notion that climate 
is an inherently multilevel construct. Zohar and Luria (2005) explained that organization-
level climate is created through organizational policies and procedures that are clear and 
continuously maintained, while group-level climate is created when supervisors fail to 
maintain this stability and unambiguity; climate strength therefore arises when 
managerial action forms a coherent pattern.  
Recent research has supported climate strength’s predictive validity; for example, 
Lingard, Cooke, and Blismas (2010) reported injury frequency rates to be significantly 
lower (two-thirds the magnitude) for workgroups with strong and high safety climates. 




current findings appear to support the construct as a moderator of mean climate – 
outcome relationships (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2002, Gonzalez-Roma et al., 2002; Schneider 
et al., 2002). The current study builds upon this literature by examining safety climate 
strength as a moderator of the relationship between safety-relevant personality constructs 
and safety performance (i.e., safety compliance and participation).   
Integrity Test Distinctions Applied to Safety 
Safety-relevant personality constructs are included in the present study as 
predictors of safety performance. While relationships between the personality constructs 
included and safety performance have been previously established, the present study 
introduces a novel component by comparing the strength of personality- performance 
relationships with those of the relationship between overt safety items and performance. 
The following section details the distinction between overt and personality-based 
measures for the purpose of selection. This typology originates in the integrity literature 
and is applied in the current study to the safety literature. Researchers of integrity tests 
have debated the use of personality –based items as compared to overt items; this 
investigation is extended in the present study to the domain of safety. Determining the 
utility of each type of test should facilitate more informed decisions when companies 
include safety components to their selection systems.  
Researchers and practitioners have employed a variety of assessments in an effort 
to predict which employees are most prone to behaving unsafely on the job, ranging from 
previous accident histories (Hatchette, 1990) to drug testing (Current, 2002). However, 




is underutilized and understudied. One type of instrument that has been widely used for 
selection purposes across industries is integrity tests, which have garnered much interest 
and research over the past few decades (Neuman & Baydoun, 1998). In fact, it has been 
posited that integrity tests may be the most frequently researched assessment for 
occupational use (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 2003). This type of test aims to assess 
job applicants’ honesty, and is administered with the purpose of screening out employees 
who are predisposed to, and most likely to engage in counterproductive behaviors, such 
as theft (Alliger, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell, 1996; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998). 
One benefit of integrity tests is that they may not demonstrate adverse impact the 
way other selection measures, such as cognitive ability tests, typically do. This was 
evidenced by Ones and Viswesvaran (1998), who conducted a study in which data from 
over 700,000 job applicants was collected. The authors found that although there were 
gender differences (i.e., women scored higher on overt integrity tests compared to men), 
only very small differences existed for applicants over or under 40 years old, and only 
trivial differences existed when minority groups were compared to white applicants. 
Given the fact that this type of test has exhibited limited adverse impact, it is likely that 
using this assessment format for safety will have the same benefit.   
Personality-based and overt selection tests. Sackett, Burris, and Callahan 
(1988) identified two broad categories of integrity tests based on Cronbach’s (1970) 
clarification of assessment types, where the purpose of the test is either clear or disguised. 
The first and most frequently used type of integrity test is of the overt nature (Sackett & 




gauge their attitudes about the frequency or punishment of dishonest behaviors (Alliger & 
Dwight, 2000; Mumford et al., 2001). For example, test-takers may be questioned about 
whether they believe theft to be a substantial issue, with the belief that those who are 
more likely to engage in devious behavior may attempt to normalize it. The purpose is to 
use this information to estimate the employees’ inclination towards future behaviors of 
this type (Whitney et al., 1999).  
 The second type of integrity test is personality-based, also known as a covert 
assessment, because the purpose of the assessment is not readily apparent (Neuman & 
Baydoun, 1998). Personality-based integrity tests try to predict counterproductive 
behavior by tapping underlying psychological traits that predispose people to behaving in 
this manner (Alliger & Dwight, 2000; Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989). For example, 
characteristics that have been included in such tests include impulse control, sociability, 
and adjustment (Gough, 1971; Neuman & Baydoun 1998; Ones, Viswesvaran, & 
Schmidt, 1993). The focus of these tests differs in terms of what criteria they aim to 
predict (Neuman & Baydoun, 1998). Namely, where overt tests attempt to predict narrow 
outcomes such as theft and related behaviors, personality-based tests have not been 
developed solely for this purpose, and are frequently used to predict a much broader 
range of undesirable work-related behaviors, such as disciplinary problems or on-the-job 
violence or drug use (Ones et al., 1993).  
Criterion-related validity of integrity tests. Multiple meta-analyses have 
demonstrated the construct validity of integrity tests, supporting their utility for 




(1993) meta-analyzed 665 validity coefficients (576,460 data points), finding that both 
types of tests were able to predict a composite measure of counterproductive behavior, 
which included disciplinary problems, disruptiveness, tardiness, absenteeism, and 
citations for negligence, among others (mean validity of all integrity tests = .47 when 
corrected for unreliability). Overt tests were found to be the stronger predictor of 
counterproductive work behaviors, with a mean validity coefficient of .41 compared to 
.32 for personality-based tests. The authors concluded that overt tests may be more useful 
in predicting these sorts of outcomes, but that this inference could be due to moderator 
variables.  
More recently, Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and Odle-Dusseau (2012) 
conducted a meta-analysis to the criterion-related validity of integrity tests. The authors 
imposed more stringent and focused inclusion criteria in terms of samples, designs, and 
variables to be included in their study (e.g., individual-level data). A total of 104 studies 
(42 published, 62 unpublished) representing 134 independent samples were included in 
the meta-analysis. The results of the analysis suggested that a moderately large 
relationship between integrity tests and counterproductive work behaviors (CWB) does in 
fact exist, estimating mean validity corrected for unreliability to be .32. This value 
increased to .36 when corrected for indirect range restriction as well. Similarly to Ones et 
al. (1998), Van Iddekinge et al. (2012) found overt tests to be stronger predictors of CWB 
compared to personality-based assessments (corrected validity estimate  = .38 and .27, 




integrity test- CWB relationship, such that the relationship was stronger (.42) when CWB 
were measured via self-reports and considerably weaker using employee records (.15).  
 Although both types of tests appear to be able to predict relevant job outcomes, 
there are inconsistent results regarding which form is best able to predict various criteria 
(Neuman & Baydoun, 1998). For example, Neuman and Baydoun (1998) found that 
personality-based integrity tests demonstrated incremental variance over overt tests when 
predicting self-reported theft and counterproductive work behaviors. However, a study by 
Frost and Rafilson (1989) found that while both types of tests comparably predicted 
counterproductive work behaviors, only the overt honesty scale was predictive of theft 
and on-the-job drug use. Results from a lab study conducted by Mumford et al. (2001) 
suggested that personality-based tests have superior validity evidence. Lastly, Ones et al. 
(2003) found personality-based tests to be stronger predictors of absenteeism compared 
to overt assessments. Another inconsistency in this body of research is whether these 
types of tests are assessing the same underlying characteristics, as some have found this 
to be the case (e.g., Mumford, et al., 2001) and some have not (e.g., Frost & Rafilson, 
1989). In sum, inconsistencies in this body of literature indicate that additional research 
could provide additional insight into how these types of assessments can predict 
employee behavior. 
Benefits and drawbacks of the types of integrity tests. Additional research 
findings have suggested a number of benefits and drawbacks associated with both types 
of integrity assessments. For example, Whitney et al. (1999) found that their sample of 




job relatedness than personality-based tests. The authors explained that these sorts of 
perceptions are important because applicants are likely to use selection procedures as a 
proxy for the organization as a whole if they have little information about a company. 
Assessments that are perceived as unrelated to the job or objectionable in other ways 
could result in reduced motivation for completion of the selection test or even increase 
the chance that the applicant could turn down an offer of employment from the company 
(Whitney et al., 1999).  
Another aspect of integrity tests that appears to be affected by the type is 
susceptibility to faking and coaching. Debate surrounding whether applicants can 
intentionally distort their responses on selection measures and whether this affects 
selection utility has continued for years. Although there does not appear to be a 
consensus regarding faking on non-cognitive measures, evidence exists to support the 
notion that applicants can and do distort responses when completing selection measures. 
Alliger and Dwight (2000) conducted a meta-analysis in an attempt to investigate the 
extent to which applicants exhibit this behavior on integrity measures. The authors found 
that although scores on both types of integrity tests can be increased by coaching and 
instructions to fake, personality-based tests were more resistant to both, concluding that 
“not all self-report non-cognitive measures are equally fakable" (p. 6).  
Although it is beyond the scope of the present review to investigate each of these 
arguments with respect to safety, this information is presented to provide a foundation for 
understanding the fact that different types of the same selection assessment can lead to 




distinction between overt and personality-based assessments to the safety literature. This 
application is a novel extension of this body of research, as no one to date has attempted 
to investigate the effect that this distinction has for the selection of safety-prone 
individuals.   
Therefore, the current study includes three personality constructs that have been 
consistently linked to safety outcomes. An assessment of these personality constructs will 
be compared to overt safety questions to investigate the predictive validity of each type. 
The following section will detail the three individual differences in personality traits that 
are thought to be especially relevant to the selection of employees who are predisposed to 
safe behavior. Additional information regarding the creation and distinction between this 
type of measure compared to an overt measure of safety will be provided in the Method 
section.  
Personality- Based Safety Assessment 
Individual differences have long been recognized as important predictors of 
workplace behavior and attitudes (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Judge et al., 2002). In fact, 
individual differences in propensity to behave safely on the job were some of the first 
variables to be examined as predictors of occupational accidents and injuries. Researchers 
have been investigating “accident-prone” individuals as early as 1918 (Vernon, 1918) in 
an attempt to predict who will be involved in safety-related workplace incidents. 
Individual differences that have been linked to safety-related outcomes include 
personality characteristics, values, attitudes, and beliefs, indicating that certain employees 




al., 2001). Forcier and colleagues (2001) emphasized the fact that personality differences 
can help explain the occurrence of workplace accidents has important implications for 
workplaces, noting the measurement of these differences facilitates more knowledgeable 
hiring and placement decisions.  
Personality characteristics that have been examined in conjunction with safety-
related outcomes include the Big Five and Type A behavior (Henning et al., 2008), 
impulsivity, aggression, social maladjustment (Hansen, 1991), and regulatory focus (i.e. 
prevention and promotion; Wallace & Chen, 2006).  The present review examines three 
personality constructs that have been consistently linked to safety outcomes: 
conscientiousness, safety locus of control, and risk propensity. These constructs were 
chosen not only due to their comparatively consistent relationships with safety but also 
based on relevance, as specific tendencies should interact specifically with safety-related 
situations to guide behavior (McCrae & Costa, 1996). As such, the present study 
hypothesizes that these personality traits will operate through safety performance to 
affect safety outcomes such as accidents, injuries, and missed days at work. Each of the 
personality characteristics of interest will be reviewed below. 
Conscientiousness. Conscientious people are characterized by tendencies towards 
achievement and responsibility or dependability (Hough, 1992; Mount & Barrick, 1995). 
Those who score highly on measures of this construct tend to be trustworthy, thorough, 
and dutiful (Hogan & Ones, 1997). The very nature of this personality trait provides 
intuitive reasoning why it would be linked to safety behavior (Wallace & Chen, 2006). 




makes them more likely to follow rules, including safety-related rules. This inclination 
may be especially strong given that conscientious individuals are also more likely to be 
cautious in nature and careful to avoid mistakes (Costa & McCrae 1992; Goldberg, 
1999). Conscientious people are also more aware of how they should behave in any given 
environment, meaning they are more likely to tailor their actions to meet safety 
expectations (Burke & Signal 2010; Henning et al., 2009). They are also more likely to 
set and strive towards goals, which may be why the personality trait has been linked to 
safety motivation (Griffin, Burley, & Neal, 2000).  
Research has generally supported the conscientiousness-safety link, yet the 
correlation is often modest in magnitude. For example, Christian et al. (2009) conducted 
a meta-analysis to examine the person-related and situation-related factors that affect 
workplace safety, and found conscientiousness to have a weak relationship to safety 
performance (Mρ= .18) and a slightly stronger relationship with safety outcomes (Mρ = 
.26). Another meta-analysis found a corrected mean validity coefficient of .31 between 
conscientiousness and accident involvement (Clarke & Robertson, 2008).  
Wallace and Chen (2006) stated that the research surrounding conscientiousness 
as a positive predictor of safety was promising but pointed out that other research had 
found conflicting results. However, the authors noted that various mediating processes 
could be the root of the divergent relationship between this personality trait and safety. 
Burke and Signal (2010) echoed this notion, stating that the generally weak relationships 
conscientiousness has with safety outcomes could be attributed to the fact that safety 




performance and outcome relationships operate. This is aligned with the fact that distal 
antecedents typically exhibit weaker relationships with outcomes than proximal ones 
(Christian et al., 2009). Although the current study does not include safety motivation as 
a mediator, the factors of safety compliance and participation are included as potential 
mechanisms through which the conscientiousness-safety outcomes relationships operate. 
Risk propensity. The tendency for an individual to take risks is another construct 
that has gained notable attention in the prediction of safety behavior, and is known as risk 
propensity or risk avoidance. Although some claim this trait is a combination of various 
Big Five traits (e.g., Nicholson, Soane, Fenton- O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005), the 
majority of researchers consider this construct to be based on Zuckerman’s (1971, 1979) 
theory of sensation-seeking. Sensation-seeking is characterized by a need for excitement, 
variety, and stimulation, along with a lack of inhibition and a desire to avoid boredom 
(Forcier et al., 2001; Rosenbloom & Wolf, 2002). Risk avoidance, on the other hand, is 
the lack of these sensation- seeking tendencies (Forcier et al., 2001). 
As with conscientiousness, the nature of this trait sheds light on why individuals 
characterized by the propensity to take risks would be more likely to be involved with a 
safety incident at work. Christian et al. (2009) explained that risk-takers often behave 
unsafely because they do not accurately assess their chances of being involved in an 
accident or because they actually enjoy the stimulation associated with danger. 
Individuals with a propensity to take risks also behave less cautiously and are more likely 
to make decisions impulsively, without thinking through the consequences of behaving in 




employees, who do not require as much stimulation and may not take risks out of 
boredom; furthermore, they are less bothered by highly structured environments, which 
are more conducive to following safety rules (Forcier et al., 2001).  
In alignment with this theory, risk propensity and sensation-seeking have been 
linked to unsafe behavior and attitudes (e.g., Ulleberg and Rundmo, 2003; Hansen, 1989) 
as well as various counterproductive behaviors such as drug and alcohol use on the job 
(Jones, Britton, & Slora, 1988). Based on research such as this, Christian et al. (2009) 
hypothesized that risk-taking would be related to safety performance (i.e. safety 
compliance and participation) as well as safety outcomes (i.e., accidents and injuries) to a 
weaker degree. The results of their meta-analysis partially supported their hypothesis, as 
risk-taking behavior was related to safety performance (Mρ = .28) but not to the more 
distal safety outcomes.  
Locus of control. Locus of control (LOC) is another individual difference that 
has been consistently examined in conjunction with safety-related outcomes. In fact, the 
theory of internal-external locus of control, first developed by Rotter (1966), was among 
the first psychological constructs investigated as a possible antecedent of accident 
potential (Janicak, 1996). Internal locus of control is characterized by the perception that 
one is generally in command of life’s events, as compared to external locus of control, 
which attributes this power to the environment or fate (Judge et al., 2003; Judge, Locke, 
Durham, & Kluger, 1998). This predisposition can affect how an individual behaves 




This personality trait is theorized to be linked to safety outcomes because, 
similarly to risk-propensity, people characterized by a fatalistic perspective have been 
demonstrated to underestimate the likelihood that they will be involved in an accident 
(Kouabenan, 1998), which could lead these individuals to take fewer precautions. 
Christian et al. (2009) explained that those who believe they can control what happens to 
them may be more likely to engage in safety training and behaviors than those who do 
not share these beliefs, as they likely think this can help them avoid safety issues. This is 
in contrast to people with fatalistic or external LOC views, who are more likely to believe 
their actions will not influence whether an accident occurs or not, especially because they 
don’t believe themselves to be direct contributors to accidents in the first place (Henning 
et al., 2009). The authors’ hypothesis was confirmed by their meta-analysis, which 
demonstrated that locus of control had a significant relationship with safety performance 
(Mρ = .35) as well as safety outcomes (Mρ = .26). Burke and Signal (2010) summarized 
that locus of control as a predictor of safety behavior and accident involvement has 
"important implications for worker selection and training" (p. 20). 
Despite a growing evidence for the LOC- safety relationship, Neal and Griffin 
(2004) point out that results pertaining to this construct are still mixed, because while 
some authors have found that internal LOC is more advantageous for accident/injury 
prevention, other researchers argue that external LOC is the better predictor. However, 
this could be due to the fact that locus of control is too broad of a construct, and that 
specifying this trait in terms of safety could create more consistent results. The construct 




likely be a more reliable predictor due to a match in specificity of constructs, which 
strengthens predictor-criterion relationships. Forcier et al. (2001) explained that the safety 
LOC scale is better suited to the work environment because it has a higher degree of face 
validity due to the fact that it refers specifically to safe work behaviors. 
Safety locus of control. Safety locus of control is based on the same underlying 
theory as LOC but refers to an individual’s perception of his or her ability to control his 
or her life events pertaining specifically to workplace safety (Jones & Wuebker, 1985). 
Namely, an employee who scores high on measures of internal safety LOC feels a sense 
of personal responsibility for their safety, whereas their external LOC counterpart does 
not. This has clear implications for a person’s likelihood of being involved in a 
workplace accident because someone who feels responsible for safety is more likely to 
take preventative steps to avoid involvement in a safety incident, since they believe the 
occurrence of accidents and injuries is contingent on their behavior. Instead, externally-
controlled individuals neither believe their actions to be directly linked to safety incidents 
nor that they have the power to control them anyway (Jones & Weubker, 1993; Forcier et 
al., 2001). Rather, these individuals “tend to perceive that accidents and injuries are 
determined by forces outside their control, such as chance events, bad luck, or negligent 
management practices" (Jones & Wuebker, 1993, p. 450). This not only places the 
employees at a greater risk but exposes their coworkers to danger as well, as an external 
safety LOC employee is less inclined to take precautions to create a safe work 




Individuals with higher internal safety LOC scores have been found to have better 
safety records than their lower internal (i.e., external) safety LOC counterparts in a 
variety of industries, and are involved in fewer accidents and injuries at work (Jones and 
Wuebker, 1993, Forcier et al., 2001). Jones and Wuebker (1993) conducted a study with 
the goal to establish the criterion-oriented validity of their Safety LOC scale. The authors 
administered their scale to 283 hospital workers, who also completed self-report 
assessments of on-the-job accidents and injuries, including the frequency, type, and 
estimated cost of the incident. The results suggested that the more external safety LOC 
employees not only had more frequent injuries than the internal safety LOC employees, 
but the injuries were more severe and costly as well.  
Similarly, Jones and Wuebker conducted another study in 1985 that showed that 
employees’ history of accident severity was linked to holding external safety beliefs 
(Jones & Wuebker, 1985). High-risk drivers have also been shown to have more external 
safety LOC tendencies (Jones & Foreman, 1984). Furthermore, measures of safety LOC 
have been found to be related to counterproductive behaviors, with external safety LOC 
individuals reporting more dishonesty, violence, and drug use potential (Wuebker, 1987). 
Wuebker (1987) concluded that these employees are likely more at risk for breaking 
rules, damaging property, and substance use on the job in addition to exhibiting poorer 
safety behaviors.  
Based on research such as this, safety locus of control, along with 




assessment. The following section clarifies how overt integrity measures will be applied 
to the safety domain in the current study.  
Overt Safety Assessment 
Some organizations have attempted to use more direct methods to predict safety 
behavior on the job. This may appear in the form of outright questions about whether the 
employee follows safety rules (known from here on as overt self-report format). The 
items could also be presented in a situational judgment type format, which is 
characterized by presenting the applicant with a hypothetical scenario and requiring the 
best course of action from a list of options to be chosen (Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 
2005). Lievens et al. (2005) summarized that situational judgment tests (SJTs) have 
become increasingly popular due to evidence suggesting their criterion-related validity, 
high face validity, and minimal adverse impact against minorities are superior compared 
to cognitive ability tests.  
The present study will use both forms of questions to create a more 
comprehensive overt safety assessment. Despite the increased concern over safety and the 
fact that pre-employment measures have been linked to reduction in work-related 
accidents (e.g., Borofsky, Wagner, & Turner, 1995), there was little research specific to 
safety to draw from to guide the creation of these items. Therefore, the present study 
applies the characteristics of overt integrity tests to create an overt safety measure. 
Namely, applicants will report their beliefs and behavior regarding on-the-job safety. As 




to estimate the applicant’s inclination towards future behaviors of this type. Information 
about the measures will be provided in greater detail in the Method section. 
The Emergence of Personality in Strong and Weak Situations 
Although it is hypothesized that both personality-based and overt safety selection 
measures will be related to safety performance, it is unlikely that this relationship will be 
uniform across safety climates. Specifically, the strength of the safety climate at both the 
group and organization level is likely to impact the relationship that safety selection 
measures have with safety performance. This hypothesis is based on the concept of 
situational strength, which is formally defined as “implicit or explicit cues provided by 
external entities regarding the desirability of potential behaviors” (Meyer, Dalal, & 
Hermida, 2009, p. 22). In other words, the characteristics of a given situation can inhibit 
the expression of employees’ individual differences (Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Weiss & 
Adler, 1984).  These characteristics determine the strength of the situation: a situation is 
considered “strong” when there is clarity about informational cues and behavioral 
expectations; incentives to comply and the ability to meet the situation’s demands also 
increase its strength (Mischel, 1977; Weiss & Adler, 1984).  
Individuals are said to be more likely to follow their behavioral inclinations in 
weak situations because their personal tendencies provide them with accessible 
information about how to respond in a given situation in the absence of environmental 
cues (Mischel & Peake, 1982). In a strong situation, where many cues provide 
information about how to behave, individual discretion becomes less salient, creating 




Dalal & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1977). In short, a strong situation is classified as one 
where there is little ambiguity, whereas a weak situation has more uncertainty. As 
previously stated, stronger climates produce more consistent behavior because there is 
greater agreement about what behavior is appropriate. People also have greater alignment 
in their expectations as well as how they perceive events, creating psychological pressure 
to behave in a manner consistent with these expectations. These conditions are in contrast 
to those that comprise a weak climate, where these expectancies about how to behave do 
not exist or are inconsistent due to a lack of clear incentives, support, or behavioral 
expectations (Beaty, Cleveland, & Murphy, 2001; González-Romá et al., 2002; Luria, 
2008; Meyer et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2002).  
A strong organizational climate has been suggested to be a good example of a 
strong situation, because strong organizations are characterized by employee consensus 
regarding desired and expected behaviors (Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirat, 2002). The 
concept of strong versus weak situations, or in this case, safety climate, is especially 
pertinent to this study because the strength of a situation can impact the expression of 
personality. Namely, strong situations elicit uniform behavior, whereas weak situations 
should result in a greater variability in behavioral responses (Mischel, 1973, 1976; 
Schneider et al., 2002). The latter allows for greater expression of personality, because 
employees rely on their predispositions to dictate appropriate behavior since the situation 
is not specifying it (Beaty et al., 2001). This theory has been strengthened by studies that 
have found the relationship between personality and outcomes to vary according to the 




been suggested to be stronger predictors of outcomes when climates are less restrictive 
(James, Demaree, Mulaik, & Ladd, 1992). Research demonstrating the moderating role of 
situational strength on personality- behavior outcomes is detailed below.  
Smithikrai (2008) conducted a study in which 612 Thai employees of government 
or private sector organizations participated. Employees completed self-report measures of 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and counterproductive work behaviors (CWB); 
situational strength was evaluated through employee assessments of group norms 
regarding CWB and performance monitoring (the observation of employees’ work-
related behaviors). The author found CWB to be significantly more prevalent in weaker 
situations. Furthermore, the relationships that the personality traits of agreeableness and 
conscientiousness had with CWB were amplified in weaker situations. The differences 
between the correlations in the strong versus weak situations were significant, as the 
average correlation between CWB and the personality traits was -.28 in the strong 
situation and -.54 in the weak situation.  
Withey, Gellatly, and Anneti (2005) also found some evidence to support 
situational strength as a moderator of personality-behavior relationships. A sample of 418 
undergraduate students were placed in situations designed to be strong or weak, where 
situational strength was manipulated by describing the scenario in vary degrees of 
ambiguity. The authors examined differences in self-reported effort provision, which was 
the students’ likelihood to expend effort to help an organization with hypothetical 
problems. The authors found self-reported Big Five personality traits to have a stronger 




the weak situation was .24, compared to .14 in the strong situation), which confirmed 
their hypothesis. The differences in correlation coefficients reached statistical 
significance for emotional stability and conscientiousness. Moreover, effort intentions 
differed according to levels of emotional stability, but only when the situation was weak.  
Another study demonstrated the role that situation strength can play in the 
predictive ability of conscientiousness. Meyer, Dalal, and Bonaccio (2009) conducted a 
meta-analysis that included 162 independent correlations and a total of 34,659 
participants in an effort to examine the relationship between conscientiousness and job 
performance. The results suggested global situational strength moderates the relationship 
between conscientiousness and both overall performance (β = -.26) and task performance 
(β = -.22), where stronger situations weaken the relationship between personality and 
performance.  The authors estimated uncorrected correlations between conscientiousness 
and performance to range from r = .09 to .23 for overall performance and r = .06 to .18 
for task performance, where correlations become stronger in occupations whose 
environment is typically weaker. 
The Present Study and Integration of Hypotheses 
The present study applies the personality-based versus overt distinction from the 
integrity test literature to safety for the purposes of selection. Because this is a novel 
approach, no specific hypotheses can be made in confidence regarding which type of 
measure will be a stronger predictor of the outcomes of interest. However, both types are 
expected to predict objective (e.g., work days missed, restricted work days) and 




individual differences in the personality traits of conscientiousness, risk propensity, and 
safety locus of control have all been predictive of safety-related outcomes in prior 
research. Furthermore, beliefs and reports of past behavior (i.e., overt measures) have 
been linked to related outcomes in integrity research; therefore, it is anticipated that this 
pattern will be replicated with safety-related variables.  
However, these relationships are expected to be mediated by safety performance 
(compliance and participation) due to the fact that safety performance is frequently 
identified as a direct antecedent of safety outcomes (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2004). The 
hypothesized relationships are in alignment with the expectation that safety performance 
will be more influenced by proximal antecedents than distal antecedents (Christian et al., 
2009) and in keeping with the many studies that have found safety performance to 
mediate predictor-safety outcome relationships. Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
 1a)  The positive relationships between conscientiousness and safety 
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance. 
1b) The positive relationships between risk propensity and safety 
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance. 
1c) The positive relationships between safety locus of control and safety 
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance. 
2a) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (SJT 




2b) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (self-
report format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety 
performance. 
The relationships that personality-based and overt safety selection measures are 
expected to have with safety performance are also hypothesized to vary across safety 
climates. Strong situations (i.e., climates) should diminish variability in behavioral 
responses and expression of personality (Beaty et al., 2001; Mischel, 1973, 1976; 
Schneider et al., 2002). Therefore, greater group-level safety climate strength is 
anticipated to weaken the relationship between the safety selection measures and safety 
performance. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
3a) The conscientiousness - safety performance relationship will be 
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the 
relationship between conscientiousness and safety performance will be 
weaker when safety climate is stronger.  
3b) The risk propensity - safety performance relationship will be 
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the 
relationship between risk propensity and safety performance will be 
weaker when safety climate is stronger.  
3c) The safety locus of control - safety performance relationship will be 
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the 
relationship between safety locus of control and safety performance will 




4a) The safety self-reported safety behavior (SJT format) - safety 
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate 
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior 
(SJT format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety climate 
is stronger. 
4b) The safety self-reported safety behavior (self-report format) - safety 
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate 
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior 
(self-report format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety 









Participants and Rationale for Inclusion 
Participants in the current study included both applicants and employees of a 
grocery store chain located across eight states in the Southeastern United States. The 
company owns and operates 206 retail stores and employs approximately 24,000 
employees. Retail trade comprises the second highest United States industry sector in 
terms of employment (Bureau of National Labor Statistics (BLS), 2010). This industry is 
not only populous but can also be dangerous, with 4.1 recordable injuries and illnesses 
for every 100 workers, and 302 fatalities in 2010 (BLS, 2010). Many such injuries result 
from ergonomic issues, such lifting heavy objects, or hazardous conditions, such as 
walking on slippery floors (Sinclair, Martin, & Sears, 2010). In fact, counter to the 
common notion that retail work is safe, the wholesale and retail trade accounted for 
20.1% of nonfatal injuries and illnesses of the private sector in 2006, despite the fact that 
it comprised only 15.5% of the worker population at that time (Anderson et al., 
2010).Using data from the BLS in 2006, Anderson et al. (2010) reported that the retail 
sector was most often exposed or engaged in incidents involving overexertion, followed 
by contact with objects/equipment, and falls.  
Anderson et al. (2010) cited Leigh et al.’s (2004) calculations of total costs for 
fatal and nonfatal injuries, showing grocery stores to have the highest cost for such 
incidents out of the eight top-ranking retail sectors, at $2.7 billion dollars. The authors 




of this nature could save organizations in the long run, calculating for retail trade, a 35% 
reduction in injuries in the retail trade would save $3.07 billion dollars. Thus, the use of 
retail workers is appropriate for the purpose of prevention of accidents and injuries, 
which are both frequent and costly.  
In the present study, 20,470 applicants completed the pre-employment 
assessments between March 1, 2012 and April 30, 2012. Of those, 1,188 were hired for 
positions (5.8%). A total of 197 (16.5%) of these newly hired employees completed the 
employee opinion survey administered in June, 2012. These participants, (referred to in 
the remainder of the text as “matched participants,” are the sample used for the majority 
of analyses.   
The largest percentage of matched participants ranged in age from 20 to 24 
(26.9%, n = 53) followed by the Under 20 age range (22.3%, n = 44). The remainder of 
the participants were 25 or over (50.8%, n = 100). The sample consisted of 87 males 
(44.2%) and 110 females (55.8%). Most employees were White / Caucasian (64.0%, n = 
126) or Black / African American (26.4%, n = 52).  Most of the employees worked in the 
front end of the store (53.8%, n = 106), consisting of 94 cashiers (47.7%), 10 baggers 
(5.1%), one customer service associate (0.5%) and one accounting associate (0.5%). 
More than two-thirds of employees were part-time associates (68.0%, n = 134). All 
matched participants had less than four months’ tenure, as they had all been hired 
between March 11, 2012 and May 1, 2013. See Table 9 for complete demographic 






Measures of personality-based and overt safety related items were added to the 
store’s current pre-employment assessment for the purpose of the current study. Although 
they were originally supposed to be introduced in November 1, 2011, logistical issues 
delayed their inclusion until March 1, 2012. Applicants completed all items online using 
an applicant tracking system managed by a large talent management solutions company. 
Individuals who completed the store’s computer-based pre-employment application and 
questionnaire also completed the safety-related questions. These items were not used to 
screen out any applicants and were gathered solely for research purposes. Accident and 
injury data was collected from the corporate headquarters’ safety records for the period of 
time spanning March 1, 2012 until December 31, 2012. The responses of applicants who 
were selected for employment were linked to their safety records to investigate the 
individual-level relationship between the pre-employment safety items (both personality-
based and overt) and subsequent safety outcomes using a unique employee identifier.  
The span of time over which accident and injury data was collected for the present 
study was approximately ten months. This length of time was appropriate because it was 
long enough to accumulate accident and injury data, which are low base-rate events, but 
short enough such that extreme changes that would affect the safety climate are not 
expected to occur during that time (e.g., change in technology or work procedures). The 
argument for a relatively short time span for collecting this data was supported by 
findings from Beus et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis, which reported that safety climate- 




increased. Ten months is also within the time frames for injury assessment established by 
previous studies, which have ranged from three months (e.g., Hofmann & Mark, 2006) to 
the entire length of an employees’ organizational tenure (e.g., Clark, 2006b). Lastly, it the 
likelihood of detecting significant effects may actually be increased by limiting the time 
frame of the study, as mounting evidence indicates that newer employees are far more 
likely to file a workers’ compensation claim than their more tenured counterparts (e.g., 
Smith et al., 1999). In fact, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1982) reported that workers 
with one month of tenure were three times more likely to be hurt than their counterparts 
with nine months of tenure.  
Next, all retail employees completed their annual employee survey between June 
13 and July 4, 2012, administered by a third-party employee opinion survey company, on 
a voluntary basis. Only applicants hired before May 1, 2012 were eligible to participate in 
the employee survey. Measures of safety climate, safety compliance and participation, 
and self-reported safety behaviors were included in the employee survey. This enabled an 
investigation of the hypotheses proposed by the full model; namely, whether safety 
compliance and participation mediates the relationship between the pre-employment 
safety items and safety outcomes, and whether safety climate strength moderates the 
relationship between the safety selection items and the participation and/or compliance.  
Measures 
Demographic information. Individuals who applied to any job at the grocery 
store chain were required to input their date of birth (i.e., age). Additional data was 




This information, along with date of hire (i.e., tenure), department, and store, was 
included in the accident and injury data obtained from the grocery chain’s corporate 
records. A department-within-store variable was created to distinguish between units 
when computing variables at the group level. 
Applicant measures. All measures for selection purposes were a combination of 
items created or modified for the current study along with items the grocery store chain 
was already using. Existing items were combined with items that were added for the 
current study based on response option; namely, Likert-type items were combined to 
form a single scale and items with other response formats were combined to form a single 
scale). All non-Likert-type items were rationally scored by subject matter experts. 
Specifically, a numerical value was of five was assigned to the best response, four for the 
second best response, etc., with the lowest response option assigned a value of one point. 
Items of this nature included situational judgment items, items with numerical response 
formats and other continuous items with varying response formats. The full measures can 
be viewed in Tables 1 - 7; these tables also indicate the source of the items that were 
derived from extant research. 
Personality-based safety items. Assessments of conscientiousness, risk 
propensity, and safety locus of control were included to investigate whether measures of 
these constructs could predict safety outcomes. A series of items were created or 
modified based on existing research for inclusion.  
Conscientiousness. Five Conscientiousness items originating from John and 




increase variability in answers and elicit truthful responses, the stem “I see myself as 
someone who…” was changed to “Others would say…” Examples include “I do a 
thorough job” and “I am a reliable worker.” Participants indicated their extent of 
agreement with the items on a five-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree. Higher scores are indicative of a greater inclination towards 
conscientiousness. Empirical research has demonstrated that the BFI maintains 
acceptable psychometric properties even when reduced to a quarter of its original items 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007). 
The grocery chain’s existing assessment contained seven conscientiousness items 
with non-Likert-type response formats. The existing items presented employees with a 
scenario or description; participants were then required to select the best choice or the 
response that best describes him/her to the question from five options. Example items 
include “How would others rate the quality of your work?” and “Compared to others, 
how thoroughly do you clean?” These items were designed to assess whether the 
respondent chooses a response that is aligned with a conscientious personality.  
Risk propensity. Risk propensity was assessed using modified versions of three 
items from Westaby and Lowe’s (2009) Risk Taking Orientation at Work scale and two 
items from Meertens et al.’s (2008) Risk Propensity scale. A sample item from the former 
scale is “I'd rather be a risk-taker than overly cautious” and a sample item from the latter 
scale is “I usually view risks as a challenge.” Original response options were changed so 




Disagree to Strongly Agree. Four items were reverse scored so that lower scores indicate 
a greater propensity to take risks. 
Three additional items that assessed risk propensity were currently in the pre-
employment assessment distributed by the talent management company. These items 
were rationally scored and evaluated as a separate scale.   
Safety locus of control. Safety Locus of Control (SLOC) items were modified 
from two items from Jones and Wuebker’s (1985) scale of the same name as well as four 
items from Janicak’s (1996) Accident Locus of Control measure. A sample SLOC item 
modified from Jones and Wuebker’s (1985) SLOC scale is “Avoiding accidents at work 
is a matter of having good luck.” A sample item modified from Janicak’s (1996) 
Accident LOC measure is “It is hard to have control over the things that cause accidents 
at work.” Original response formats of the scales were changed such that all items would 
be measured on a five-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. All 
SLOC questions were designed to tap the individual’s perception of their ability to 
control his or her life events pertaining specifically to workplace safety (Jones & 
Wuebker, 1985; 1993). Four of the items were reverse scored so that higher values 
indicate a more internal locus of control. 
The predictive validity of the Safety Locus of Control scale was shown by Jones 
and Wuebker (1985), who demonstrated that participants’ accident severity history was 
linked to more external safety beliefs. Logistic regression analyses reported in Janicak’s 
(1996) study designed to investigate the predictive validity of his Accident Locus of 




86% of cases. Split-half reliability estimates for both scales have also been of adequate 
magnitude, with a reliability coefficient of .85 for the Safety Locus of Control Scale 
(Jones & Wuebker, 1985) and .69 for the Accident Locus of Control Scale (Janicak, 
1992).  
Two rationally-scored items were provided by the talent management company to 
be added to the selection system which required the applicant to choose the best option 
from a list of five choices. These items were designed to assess whether the applicant 
accepts responsibility for safe working practices and items were analyzed as a separate 
scale. A sample item is, “Who is responsible for ensuring that safe work practices are 
followed?”  
Overt safety items. As with the personality items, overt safety items were either 
Likert-type items on a five-point scale, or were rationally scored items with varying 
response formats. The first four items were the Likert-type items and were created for the 
current study; these items were designed to measure the applicant’s beliefs regarding 
safety as well as their previous safety behavior, which is in line with overt integrity 
measures. Two items were reverse scored such that higher scores indicate a greater 
awareness of safety and inclination to engage in safe behavior. The questions asked 
participants to indicate their agreement to the statements on a five-point scale ranging 
from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. The first item, “I follow safety rules with few 
reminders,” addresses admissions of safety, similarly to the way the London House 
Personnel Selection Inventory’s (PSI) honesty scale, an overt integrity test, asked 




‘safety first’" aimed to examine applicants’ attitudes towards safety, similar to the way 
the Reid Integrity test, another well-known overt integrity test, assesses applicants’ 
attitudes towards honesty and other integrity-related behaviors, such as theft and drug use 
(Mumford et al., 2001). The third and fourth items “I don't believe the same safety rules 
apply to everyone” and “I believe it's acceptable to bend or break safety rules if no one 
will get hurt” attempt to determine the applicants’ acceptance of common rationalizations 
about safety (Frost & Rafilson, 1989). Acceptance of rationalizations and beliefs about 
others’ behaviors are two additional approaches used by the PSI to gauge safety.  
The second set of four overt items were created in a situational-judgment type 
question format, where the applicant was given a scenario and was then required to 
choose the best of five options presented. A sample item of this format is “You see a 
coworker breaking a safety rule. What would you do?” For this example, the response 
that would receive the lowest score is “Nothing” and the response that would receive the 
highest score is “Immediately approach the employee to tell him/her that a safety rule is 
being broken.” This final set of items were rationally scored and combined to form a 
single scale. 
Employee measures. Measures completed by all employees during the annual 
survey administered in June 2012 included a safety climate assessment, safety 
compliance and participation scales, and three items for participants to report safety 
outcomes. Because the safety items were a new addition to the yearly survey that the 





[Store name] cares about each and every one of its associates, and 
our goal is to maintain a safe and healthy environment for you to 
work and shop. To help us attain that goal, we have added 
questions to this year’s survey about safety at [store name].  We 
are looking to you, our associates, to provide insight into your 
work environment. Answering the questions honestly will help is 
identify areas that we can improve upon and areas in which we are 
already succeeding. By providing your opinion about safety issues 
at [store name], you can help us strive for an accident- and injury-
free workplace. 
Safety climate strength. Items from Zohar and Luria’s (2005) safety climate scale 
were used to measure this construct. In the original version, this scale contains 32 
different items, 16 of which measure organization-level safety climate and 16 of which 
measure group-level safety climate. In the current study, nine of the original 16 group-
level items were used and two of the original organization-level items were included. A 
final change to this scale was in the stem of the items. In order to assess group-level 
safety climate, “My direct supervisor” was changed to “My department manager.” This 
change was instituted to reduce ambiguity regarding to which manager the items referred. 
Items were chosen based on their relevance to the current sample with the 
rationale that any question that was not applicable to the current sample would have little 
variability and detract from the measure’s reliability. Items were also selected based on 




use this information for promotion eligibility, it would have been unfair to assign low 
safety ratings to a manager for a work aspect that he or she has no control over. Lastly, 
this number of questions was included so that the entire domain of safety climate could 
be assessed while maintaining parsimony of measurement.  
Participants indicated the extent of their agreement with these statements on a 
five-point scale (reduced from the original seven-point scale) ranging from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree. In accordance with the recommendations of Schneider et al. 
(2002), group-level climate strength was calculated by examining the standard deviation 
of each group’s average safety climate perceptions (Zohar & Luria, 2005). A lower 
standard deviation indicates a higher strength of climate because it reflects a lesser degree 
of variability in perceptions.  
As detailed earlier, climate perceptions inherently form into levels because 
although policies and procedures are created at the organization-level, they are 
implemented at the unit level, allowing for variability as a result of individual supervisors 
that manage each unit (Zohar, 2000). Zohar (2006) emphasized that this process 
necessitates the separate measurement, aggregation, and scoring of safety climate 
perceptions at the level of interest. Separating items from different levels should help 
reduce level discrepancy errors (Zohar, 2010) and can prevent the distortion of results 
interpretations (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996). The current study was focused on the safety 
climate strength as a group-level construct.   
Zohar and Luria’s (2005) Multilevel Safety Climate (MSC) measure was 




Controlling), Proactive Practices (Instructing–Guiding), and Declarative Practices 
(Declaring–Informing). However, a single-factor structure will be employed for the 
present study. Johnson (2007) used structural equation modeling to determine that a 
single-factor structure also provides adequate fit to the data; moreover, the three 
dimensions were highly correlated in the author’s study, suggesting that they are all 
ultimately tapping the same construct. In fact, Zohar and Luria (2005) used a single 
global factor for safety climate, based on numerous cross- loadings of items as well as 
high inter-correlations among the factors.  
The present study aims to operationalize group-level safety climate (and its 
standard deviation, safety climate strength) as a unidimensional factor on the basis of this 
research. Furthermore, all three original subscales are concerned with management 
practices and nearly all safety climate measures have a management component, which is 
the focus of the present paper. Additional support for using a single management-focused 
factor was garnered from a study conducted by Beus et al. (2010) who found that 
“perceived management commitment to safety is the most robust predictor of 
occupational injuries” (p. 713). Lastly, as previously mentioned, the purpose of the safety 
climate assessment should be the determining factor in whether a higher-order factor is 
more appropriate than precise first-order factors (Griffin & Neal, 2000); a single-factor 
construct focusing on management practices as a whole was the best option given the 
present model and proposed study.  
Numerous studies have provided support for the reliability and validity of Zohar 




behavior as well as injury frequency/ severity rates (Johnson, 2007). Zohar and Luria 
(2005) reported a Cronbach alpha of .95. Johnson (2007) also demonstrated that multiple 
items can be removed from the scale while maintaining the integrity of the measure.  
Safety compliance and participation. Three items each were used to assess safety 
compliance and safety participation. These questions were selected from multiple sources 
in order to maximize the relevance of each item to the current sample. Participants 
indicated their agreement with all items on a five point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  
Two safety compliance items were drawn from Neal and Griffin’s (2004) scale. 
The items are: “I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job” and “I use the 
correct safety procedures for carrying out my job.” The third safety compliance item was 
modified from Vinodkumar and Bhasi’s scale (2010): “I carry out my work in a safe 
manner.” 
 Vinodkumar and Bhasi’s (2010), measures of safety compliance and safety 
participation have demonstrated sufficient reliability coefficients (alpha = .76 and .66, 
respectively) and had positive relationships with safety knowledge and safety motivation. 
Neal and Griffin’s (2004) safety compliance and participation scales have consistently 
demonstrated high reliability coefficients as well as significant relationships with 
accidents at the group level (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2006).  
One safety participation item was from Neal and Griffin’s (2004) scale, and read, 
“I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace.” The second item was 




management any safety related matters that I notice.” Lastly, the third item was from the 
helping subscale of Hofmann et al.’s safety citizenship measure, and stated, “I assist 
others to make sure they perform their work safely.” Hofmann et al.’s (2003) study 
provided evidence for a safety citizenship – safety climate relationship.  
  Safety outcomes. Safety outcomes were measured by both objective data 
collected from the grocery store company’s corporate headquarters as well as subjective 
data self-reported by the participant.  
Objective outcomes. Objective data was gathered from the grocery store’s 
corporate records, and included work days missed due to an injury as well as restricted 
days due to an injury. Restricted days refer to work days when the injured employee 
could come to work but may not complete the full range of tasks or length of hours he or 
she would typically perform. Records that indicate that a worker suffered an injury but 
did not miss any days of work were classified as micro-accident data, which refers to 
minor injuries that require medical attention but do not require lost workdays, 
differentiating micro-accidents from ordinary accidents (Zohar, 2000). The micro-
accident outcome was computed as a dichotomous outcome where an employee had a 
recorded accident/injury but did not miss any work days afterwards. 
 Micro-accidents are increasingly being incorporated into safety research to 
address some of the measurement difficulties associated with using accidents or 
reportable injuries as outcome measures. Namely, the fact that that accidents and injuries 
are statistically rare events suggests that they may not be able to adequately tap the more 




Furthermore micro-accidents are less likely to present skewed distributions because they 
occur much more often, while maintaining the benefits associated with objective 
measures of safety (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar, 2000). Lastly, micro-accidents exhibit a 
strong relationship with lost-days accidents and take much less time to accumulate in 
sufficient quantity (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar, 2000).  
 Self-reported outcomes. Self-reported questions used to measure subjective 
outcomes included a near-miss item, which asks about the frequency of occurrences of 
on-the-job incidents in the past year that could have resulted in an injury but did not. This 
item was modified from Goldenhar, Williams, and Swanson (2003); applicants chose one 
of five responses, ranging from “Zero” to “Seven or More.” Goldenhar et al.’s (2003) 
near-miss item has been positively linked to self-reported injuries (r = .13, p < .05) and 
negatively related to 5safety compliance (r = -.18, p < .01). 
Similarly to micro-accident data, near-misses are increasingly being included in 
safety research because they are closely associated with actual accident frequency 
(Powell, Schechtman, & Riley, 2007) and have a higher base rate than actual accidents 
and injuries found (Burke & Signal, 2010), increasing the chance that an effect will be 
detected. In support of this hypothesis, a study by Probst (2004) found that safety 
behavior exhibited a stronger relationship with near-misses than other safety outcomes.  
A second self-report item asks participants to indicate how many times in the past 
year a minor injury was suffered that did not require treatment. The item was modified 
from a scale used in Sinclair et al. (2010), who found a negative relationship between 




been suggested as a more fine-grained measure of safety performance to use in 
examining group safety climate – injury rate relationships (Zohar, 2000, 2002). This 
suggestion is based on arguments similar to those in support of micro-accident outcome 
variables, as an indicator of safety performance that occurs more frequently than serious 
incidents is necessary to detect significant relationships (Hopkins, 2009).  
Lastly, a final self-report question asked employees to indicate the number of 
times musculoskeletal (MSK) pain was experienced in the past year at work. A 
description of musculoskeletal symptoms was provided to ensure that each employee 
understood the question and could determine whether he or she had experienced pain of 
that nature. This question was added to ensure the issues most pertinent to the sample 
were addressed. MSK pain results from repeated use and overextension of the muscles 
and back, and comprises the bulk of injuries in retail workers (Campany & Personick, 
1992). This item was modified from a scale used in Sinclair et al.’s (2010) study of labor 
union members’ perceptions of safety climate in the retail industry; the authors’ measure 
was based on ergonomic surveys of MSK pain. Sinclair et al. (2010) found a significant 
relationship between their MSK measure and both self-reported near-miss (r = .25, p < 
.05) and minor injuries (r = .18, p < .05). 
 In addition to the fact that the objective outcomes are low-frequency events, the 
use of self-reported data is justifiable because results from a similar study suggested that 
“common methods bias may not be a major concern in the safety domain;” furthermore, 
if common method bias did exist, it would actually mean that studies underestimate 




underreporting of accident and injuries (Christian et al., 2009, p. 1122). Furthermore, 
other studies found only negligible differences in self-reported safety performance ratings 
compared to coworker and supervisor ratings (e.g., Burke et al., 2002). Lastly, reliability 
coefficients in self-reported criteria have been found to be higher than external criteria in 









All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 20.0 and EQS 6.1. Means, 
standard deviations, individual-level inter-correlations and reliability coefficients are 
displayed in Table 8. Demographics of the matched participants are available in Table 9. 
Matched participants are those who completed the pre-employment measures, were hired, 
and also completed the employee survey measures. Because only six of those individuals 
also had a reported accident or injury, analyses could not be conducted exclusively on 
those who had complete data, as the sample size was too low to provide reliable or 
meaningful results. Specifically, the goal of the analyses was to determine whether the 
predictors of interest could explain variance in accident/injury occurrence, but a sample 
size of six does not provide sufficient variance to predict.  
For the three personality variables, results of reliability statistics and confirmatory 
factor analysis suggested the Likert-type format items and the rationally scored, SJT 
format items (including items already in the pre-employment measures from the talent 
management company) may not be measuring the same constructs as the Likert-type 
format items (see Tables 10a-b). Thus, the decision was made to retain only the Likert-
type format items for these scales (Safety Locus of Control items 1-6, Risk Propensity 
items 1-5, and Conscientiousness items 1-5). Reliability analyses guided the removal of 




responsibility of the company.”) and one self-report Overt Safety item (“I don't believe 
the same safety rules apply to everyone.”).  
Individual-level inter-correlations. Individual-level correlations were examined 
using the matched participants (see Table 8). The results suggested that all three 
personality-based variables were significantly and positively related to each other, with 
correlations ranging from .372 to .476 (p < .01). The two overt safety variables were not 
significantly related to each other, but the self-report format overt safety items were 
correlated with to all three personality variables. The SJT format overt safety variable 
was related to missed work days (.968, p < .01). Safety climate average and strength were 
also related to each other (-.147, p < .05), which provided additional support for Lindgard 
et al.’s (2010) findings that stronger climates tended to be higher in valence (more 
positive).  
The three subjective safety outcomes were also related to each other, with 
correlations rating from .227 (p < .01) to .318 (p < .01), suggesting that employees with 
higher reports of one type of subjective safety outcome (e.g., near-misses) also have 
higher reports of other types (e.g., work-related MSK pain). Some of the subjective safety 
outcomes had significant relationships with objective safety outcomes. Specifically, the 
missed work days variable was strongly correlated with reports of near-miss (.968, p < 
.01) and MSK pain (.866, p < .01). This may provide some evidence that the less severe 
subjective safety outcomes are precursors to the more severe objective safety outcomes. 
This finding has been substantiated by previous studies; for example, Powell et al. (2006) 




likely to report having an actual driving accident, as compared with participants with no 
near-miss reports. 
All three personality variables were significantly and positively related to safety 
performance (risk propensity = .176, p < .05; safety locus of control = .213, p < .01; 
conscientiousness = .215, p < .01), indicating that individuals higher on these traits 
reported more safety compliance and participation behaviors. Safety performance was 
also related to group safety climate strength (.615, p < .01) and work-related MSK pain (-
.289, p < .01). Group-level safety climate strength was also significantly correlated with 
missed work days (-.812, p < .05), suggesting that employees in groups with stronger 
safety climates were less likely to miss work days due to an accident/injury. 
 Sample sizes. Personality measures (conscientiousness, risk propensity, and 
safety locus of control) and overt safety measures (self-report/ Likert-type and rationally 
scored SJT type) were added to the pre-employment assessment for a grocery chain in 
March 2012. Only employees who were hired before May 2012 were eligible to take the 
yearly employee survey in June 2012, restricting the key data collection period to two 
months. A total of 20,470 applicants completed the pre-employment measures in the two-
month period, and 17,395 employees completed the yearly survey in 2012; however, only 
197 completed both. This number is the sample size of the majority of the analyses being 
conducted to test the full model. Although 832 accident/injury records were available, 
only six belonged to an employee who had both completed the pre-employment measures 




Matched pre-employment – accident/injury data was available for 67 participants; 
matched employee survey – accident/injury data was available for 600 employees. 
The safety climate strength variable was created by 1) creating a unique group 
identifier of department within store (e.g., Store 4 Floral, Store 164 Frozen, etc.), 2) 
restricting analyses to groups with four or more members, and 3) computing a new 
variable where safety climate strength equaled the standard deviation of safety climate 
average for the group to which the individual belonged. The restriction for at least four 
participants in a group was made because any group with only a single member would 
automatically have a standard deviation of zero, but would be an indication of group size 
as opposed to climate strength. It was determined that groups with four or more 
participants would provide a more accurate and stable depiction of actual safety climate 
strength.  
There were 204 stores and 14 departments per store, but not all stores had 
participants in each department. When the full data set was employed, a total of 2,362 
unique groups were present; this number reduced to 1,220 once groups with three or 
fewer individuals were filtered out. There was an average of 11.97 employees per group 
within the full data set. The 197 matched participants were spread across 161 groups 
(1.22 employees per group on average). When examining the actual size of the group 
from which each matched participant came (the full data set), the average was 19.83.  
The average group size for the matched participants (19.83) was quite a bit larger 
than the average group size overall (11.97); this is largely due to differences in the make-




most common role, in comparison with the overall data set which was only comprised of 
30% cashiers. Further, many of the departments that typically have only a single 
employee (e.g., Floral) were underrepresented in the matched data, thus increasing the 
average group size. 
Justification for aggregation. The present study has introduced the construct of 
safety climate and argued for its inherent multilevel nature. In order to determine the 
appropriate levels of analysis for the variable and to justify aggregation of individual 
responses to a group- level construct, a specified set of conditions must be met (Bliese, 
2000; Zohar, 2000). Specifically, the unit of analysis may naturally occur, and both 
within-group homogeneity and between-group variance must exist. Within-group 
homogeneity indicates the degree to which perceptions about safety climate are shared 
within a group, where between-group variance indicates the degree to which different 
groups within the same organization vary in their safety climate perceptions. On the basis 
of these conditions, safety climate strength was intended to be aggregated on individual 
scores to Level 2 (department within store). The ICC(1), the ICC(2), and the Rwg(j) 
statistic were calculated to provide evidence for aggregation. These statistics have been 
used to justify aggregation of data in numerous previous studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010; 
Wallace & Chen, 2006; Zohar, 2000).  
The ICC(1) provides an estimate of the intra-class correlation, which indicates the 
amount of variance in the dependent variable that can be attributed to group membership 
(Bliese, 2000). The ICC(1) essentially determines between-unit variance compared to 




membership has a greater influence on individual perceptions (Klein & Koslowski, 2000; 
LeBreton & Senter, 2008). For the present study, the ICC(1) was calculated to determine 
whether a meaningful amount of variance in department Safety Climate average could be 
attributed to the group (an employee’s department within store).  
The ICC(2), which is an estimate of the reliability of unit means in a given 
sample, was used to calculate between-group variance. A general rule of thumb is that the 
ICC(2) should also be greater than or equal to .70 to conclude that the means reliably 
indicate unit scores, as with other measures of reliability (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha; Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992; Klein & Koslowski, 2002). A larger ICC(2) indicates that mean 
ratings distinguish units from each other to a greater degree (James, 1982).  
The ICC(1) and ICC(2) were calculated using and intercepts-only mixed model 
and a one-way random effects analysis of variance (ANOVA), respectively. In these 
analyses, the grouping variable (store_dept) was entered as the predictor and department 
Safety Climate average was entered as the dependent variable (Bliese, 1998). In keeping 
with all analyses involving group size or safety climate strength, analyses were limited to 
groups larger than three (n = 14,609).   
The ICC(1) value was calculated by dividing the intercept variance from the fixed 
effects output by the sum of the intercept variance and the residual variance. The 
calculated ICC(1) was 0.059, which indicates that 5.9% of the variance in Safety Climate 
average can be attributed to the department in which the employee works. This number is 
within the typical range of ICC(1) values (.05 - .20; Bliese, 2000; Snijders & Bosker, 




Between and Mean Square Within by the Mean Square Between. The calculated ICC(2) 
was .413, which indicates that the safety climate means formed at the group-level have 
low reliability (Bliese, 2000).  
Within-group homogeneity was assessed using the rwg(p) statistic, which is an 
index of agreement or consensus between group members. The rwg compares variance of 
a variable within a group to an expected random variance. Justification for aggregating a 
lower level variable to a higher level of analysis is provided when “variability within a 
unit is substantially smaller than the variability expected by chance” (Klein & Koslowski, 
2000, p. 222). A larger rwg value is indicative of greater agreement among group 
members, with an rwg mean of .70 or greater serving as a common rule of thumb to justify 
aggregation (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).The rwg(p) can 
also be calculated using the Mean Square Error in the Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
from a univariate general linear model. An rwg(p) value of .742 was found from the results 
of this analysis, indicating that the ratings of safety climate were largely interchangeable 
due to the low group variance.   
 Descriptive statistics were used to understand the amount of variability in safety 
climate strength values across groups. The standard deviation was fairly low, SD = 0.229 
(n = 13,615). A one-way ANOVA was also conducted where the grouping variable was 
the IV and safety climate strength was the DV and the analysis was restricted to groups of 
four or larger. The results suggested that the group to which an employee belonged was 




their safety climate strength, F (1219, 13614) = 3.56x10
31
, p < .001, indicating significant 
group variance. 
Multicollinearity. The bivariate relationships between the predictors were tested 
to address the issue of multicollinearity, which refers to a strong linear relationship 
between predictors (i.e., at least .80; Chatterjee; Hadi, & Price, 2000; Lomax, 2001). 
Multicollinearity can be problematic when the independent variables are so highly 
correlated that they no longer convey unique information. In other words, determining 
which predictor is producing the effect on the dependent variable becomes difficult 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Given the fact that the present study aims to determine whether 
personality-related or overt safety items are better predictors of safety performance and 
subsequent safety outcomes, it was important to be able to identify the source of the 
effect on the dependent variable (Lomax, 2001). Consequently, tests of multicollinearity 
were conducted to determine whether this was a potential issue.  
Tolerance and its reciprocal, variance inflation factor (VIF), were used to indicate 
whether multicollinearity was a potential threat by showing the extent to which the 
predictors’ relationships are inflating an individual predictor’s regression coefficient 
estimate. A tolerance value approaching zero reflects a high risk of the problem, as does a 
VIF of 10 or higher (Kleinbaum et al., 1988; Lomax, 2001). Group size was included in 
this test as a control variable to maintain consistency with the other analyses in the 
current study. None of the personality-based or overt safety predictors had tolerance or 
VIF levels approaching these points, and multicollinearity was determined not to be 




However, because of the high degree of multicollinearity between compliance and 
participation (correlation of .75), the six items from the two scales were averaged to form 
a safety performance scale. This choice was made given the fact that the focus of the 
current study is on the predictors of the model and not differentiating between the 
components of safety performance. The six items combined had an extremely high 
internal reliability (α = .96). 
Hypothesis Tests 
 The first series of hypotheses (1a-c) posited that safety-related personality 
variables (conscientiousness, risk aversion, and safety locus of control) would be 
positively related to safety outcomes (subjective and objective measures of accidents and 
injuries) and that these relationships would be mediated by safety performance. The 
second set of hypotheses (2a-b) predicted the same relationships, where the overt 
measures of safety are the predictors. All variables in the first two sets of hypotheses are 
Level 1 (individual-level) variables. 
Bootstrapping was used to test these hypothesized relationships, as detailed by 
Preacher and Hayes (2004). Bootstrapping has been suggested to be superior to other 
mediation techniques because it is not constrained by underlying assumptions about 
sample distributions (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Mediation is indicated by a significant 
indirect effect, which is demonstrated when zero does not fall within the 95 percent 
confidence interval that is computed around the product term (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 





 In line with these recommendations, bootstrapping mediation analyses using 
5,000 bootstrap samples (unless otherwise noted in the tables) for bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence intervals were conducted to test Hypotheses 1a – 2b. Hypotheses 
with near-misses as the DV required logistic regression bootstrapping because restriction 
of the sample to participants with complete data resulted in a dichotomous variable. 
Specifically, all matched participants chose either the lowest or the second-lowest near-
miss range out of the five response options. Therefore, unlike mediation models with a 
continuous mediator and outcome, the “total effect will not be equal to the sum of the 
direct and indirect effects due to the arbitrary scaling of the error in estimation in the 
logistic regression model” (SPSS PROCESS documentation, 2012, p. 9). 
The effects of the personality and overt safety variables on the objective safety 
outcomes could not be tested. Namely, the restriction of the sample to participants with 
complete data (n = 6) resulted in dichotomous mediator variable (five of the six 
employees had a safety performance average of 5.0 and the sixth had a 3.67, making 
safety performance a dichotomous variable). This prevented the bootstrapping analyses 
from running when the objective outcomes of missed work days, restricted work days, or 
micro-accidents were the dependent variables. The results for each testable proposed 
relationship are below. Additional statistics for hypotheses 1a-c can be found in Table 12; 
additional statistics for hypotheses 2a-b can be found in Table 13. 
1a)  The positive relationships between conscientiousness and safety 




The results from bootstrapping indicated that the direct effect of 
conscientiousness on any of the outcomes was not significant (near misses, t = 
.764, p = .445, β = -0.502 with a 95% confidence interval (CI) from -1.790 to 
0.786., minor injuries, t = 0.933, p = .352, β = 0.147 with a 95% CI from -0.164 to 
0.457, MSK pain, t = 0.601, p = .549, β = 0.112 with a 95% CI from -0.256 to 
0.481). Bootstrapping analyses also failed to yield a significant mean indirect 
effect of conscientiousness on near-misses, β = -0.080 with a 95% CI from -0.451 
to 0.157, or minor injuries, β = 0.0003 with a 95% CI from -0.073 to 0.063, 
through safety performance.   
The indirect effect of conscientiousness on MSK pain through safety 
performance was significant, β = -0.136 with a 95% CI from -0.350 to -0.025. 
This indicates that higher conscientiousness was associated with lower MSK pain 
when operating through safety performance. The presence of negative indirect 
effects and positive direct effects indicate the presence of inconsistent mediation 
(Davis, 1985), i.e., a suppressor effect (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). 
Namely, the indirect relationship between conscientiousness and MSK pain is 
artificially inflated by the negative and significant safety performance-MSK pain 
relationship (β = -0.5156, p < .001, 95% CI from -0.7747 to -0.2565). Total 
effects for the model were not significant. 
Practically, this pattern of relationships suggests that more conscientious 
people actually have more MSK pain, perhaps due to their proclivity to work 




performance overall have lower MSK pain, indicating that the safe behaviors can 
make up for the negative effect that high conscientiousness could have 
independently.   
1b) The positive relationships between risk propensity and safety 
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance. 
The direct effect of risk propensity on any of the outcomes was not 
significant, (near misses, t = -0.100, p = .920, β =-0.034 with a 95% CI from -
0.705 to 0.636; minor injuries, t = 0.642, p = .522, β =0.050 with a 95% CI from -
0.103 to 0.203; MSK pain, t = 1.586 p = .114, β =0.145 with a 95% CI from -
0.035 to 0.326). Results from bootstrapping failed to yield a significant mean 
indirect effect of risk propensity on near-misses (β =-0.039 with a 95% CI from -
0.204 to 0.044) or minor injuries (β = 0.002 with a 95% CI from -0.026 to 0.029) 
through safety performance.  
The indirect effect of risk propensity on MSK pain through safety 
performance was significant, β = -0.057 with a 95% confidence interval from -
0.150 to -0.007. This indicates that lower risk propensity is associated with lower 
reported MSK pain, operating through safety performance. (Note that risk 
propensity was recoded such that a higher value on this variable is indicative of 
lower risk-taking inclination).  
The presence of negative indirect effects and positive direct effects 
indicate the presence of suppression. Namely, the indirect relationship between 




significant safety performance-MSK pain relationship (β = -0.532, p < .001 with a 
95% CI from -0.789 to -0.2762). Total effects for the model were not significant. 
This pattern of relationships suggests that people less inclined to take risk actually 
have more MSK pain; however, because the individuals who also have high 
safety performance overall have lower MSK pain, the safe behaviors can make up 
for the negative effect that low risk propensity alone could have.   
1c) The positive relationships between safety locus of control and safety 
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance. 
Results from bootstrapping indicated that the direct effect of safety locus 
of control on any of the outcomes was not significant (near-misses, t = 0.865, p = 
.392, β = 0.494 with a 95% CI from -0.637 to 1.625; minor injuries, t = 1.60, p = 
.248, β = 0.140 with a 95% CI from -0.098 to 0.378; MSK pain, t = 1.300, p = 
.196, β = 0.186 with a 95% CI from -0.097 to 0.469). Bootstrapping analyses also 
failed to yield a significant mean indirect effect of safety locus of control on near-
misses (β = -0.085 with a 95% CI from -0.399 to 0.084) or minor injuries (β = 
0.002 with a 95% CI from -0.059 to 0.050) through safety performance.  
The indirect effect of safety locus of control on MSK pain through safety 
performance was significant, β = -0.104 with a 95% confidence interval from -
0.268 to -0.019. This indicates that higher safety locus of control is associated 





The presence of negative indirect effects and positive direct effects 
indicate the presence of suppression. Namely, the indirect relationship between 
safety locus of control and MSK pain is artificially inflated by the negative and 
significant safety performance-MSK pain relationship (β = -0.5312, p < .001 with 
a 95% CI from -0.789 to -0.273). Total effects for the model were not significant. 
The fact that the pattern of results with MSK pain as the outcome greatly 
differed from those with near-miss or minor injuries as the outcome indicates that 
there is something distinguishing MSK pain from the other subjective safety 
outcomes. For example, it is possible that significant effects can be detected with 
MSK pain easier than the other two outcomes since it is expected to be a higher-
frequency event. Another possible explanation is that MSK pain may be such a 
common-place experience that it is harder for participants to clearly remember the 
frequency of such an outcome and had to guess as to their experience with it.  
2a) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (SJT 
format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety performance. 
Results from bootstrapping failed to yield a significant mean indirect 
effect of self-reported safety behavior (SJT format) on any of the outcomes (near-
misses, (t = 0.792, p = .423, β = -0.045 with a 95% CI from -0.359 to 0.048; 
minor injuries, t = -0.805, p = .422, β = 0.003 with a 95% CI from -0.026 to 
0.061; MSK pain, t = -0.561, p = .576, β = -0.063 with a 95% CI from -0.229 to 
0.037) through safety performance. The direct effect of self-reported safety 




misses, β = 0.429 with a 95% CI from -0.632 to 1.489; minor injuries, β = -0.096 
with a 95% CI from -0.330 to 0.139; MSK pain, β = -0.079 with a 95% CI from -
0.358 to 0.200). 
2b) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (self-
report format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety 
performance. 
Results from bootstrapping failed to yield a significant mean indirect 
effect of self-reported safety behavior (self-report format) on any of the outcomes 
(near-misses, t = 0.058, p = .954, β = -0.045 with a 95% CI from -0.359 to 0.048; 
minor injuries, t = 0.720, p = .472, β = 0.003 with a 95% CI from -0.026 to 0.061; 
MSK pain, t = 1.523, p = .128, β = -0.063 with a 95% CI from -0.229 to 0.037) 
through safety performance. The direct effect of self-reported safety behavior 
(SJT format) on any of the outcomes was also not significant (near-misses, β = 
0.037 with a 95% CI from -1.222 to 1.296 minor injuries, β = 0.105 with a 95% 
CI from -0.182 to 0.391 or MSK β = 0.262 with a 95% CI from -0.076 to 0.601).  
The third (3a-c) and fourth (4a-b) sets of hypotheses stated that the positive 
relationships that the personality-related and overt safety variables have with safety 
performance would be moderated by group-level safety climate strength. Specifically, the 
predictor-criterion relationships were hypothesized to be weaker when safety climate is 
stronger, due to the diminishing effect that strong situations have on the variance of 




Mixed models were going to be used to test these series of hypotheses because 
safety climate is a group-level, or Level 2, variable; however, the small sample size 
eliminated the ability to conduct multilevel modeling on the data. Hox (2002; 2010) 
suggests a minimum of 50 groups with at least five cases per group to avoid increased 
Type I errors and underestimation of random effects and their standard errors. Busing 
(1993) and van der Leeden and Busing (1994) recommend having at least 30 groups with 
at least 30 observations per group for sufficient power to detect cross-level interactions, 
as proposed in the current study. Other recommendations for sample size are more 
rigorous: Hox (1998) proposed that 50 groups with 20 cases per group would be 
preferable for examining cross-level interactions. However, in the current study, the 197 
matched participants were spread across 161 groups. Therefore, linear multiple regression 
was conducted to test these hypotheses with the inclusion of a dummy variable to 
partially address the nested data. This variable was created to indicate if the participant 
was the only member of their group (n = 135, 68.5%) or whether they were part of a 
group with two or more individuals (n = 62, 31.5%).  
The safety climate strength values were calculated using the entire survey data 
set, where groups had greater than or equal to four members. An individual’s safety 
climate strength value is the same for each member within a given group (department 
within store), and is equivalent to the standard deviation of the average safety climate for 
each group in the complete survey data set. The entire group’s responses were used to 




participant’s safety climate perceptions and strength would be affected by the rest of the 
group, even if those members did not have complete data across the entire study. 
To test the hypotheses, a series of five-step moderated regressions were 
conducted, where the demographic variables of race, gender, age, and tenure were 
entered as Step 1. The group size dummy variable was entered as Step 2 to partially 
account for nesting. Safety climate average was entered as Step 3 to control for the 
effects of the variable’s valence. The group mean-centered personality or overt safety 
variables were entered as Step 4 along with safety climate strength; the interaction term 
of the latter two variables was entered as the final step (Step 5). See Table 14 for 
additional statistics on hypotheses 3a-c. 
3a) The conscientiousness - safety performance relationship will be 
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the 
relationship between conscientiousness and safety performance will be 
weaker when safety climate is stronger.  
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.00, p < .001), and 
accounted for 40.3% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account for 
unique variance in the model (R
2 = 0.000, p =.820. Rather, safety climate average was 
the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the model (R
2 = 0.391, p 
< .001), accounting for 39.1% of the variance in safety performance uniquely. 
3b) The risk propensity - safety performance relationship will be 




relationship between risk propensity and safety performance will be 
weaker when safety climate is stronger.  
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.10, p < .001), and 
accounted for 40.7% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account for 
unique variance in the model (R
2 = 0.003, p = .514). Again, safety climate average was 
the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the model. 
3c) The safety locus of control - safety performance relationship will be 
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the 
relationship between safety locus of control and safety performance will 
be weaker when safety climate is stronger.  
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.13, p < .001), and 
accounted for 40.8% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account for 
unique variance in the model (R
2 = 0.004, p = .457). Rather, safety climate average was 
the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the model. See Table 15 
for additional statistics on hypotheses 4a-b. 
4a) The safety self-reported safety behavior (SJT format) - safety 
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate 
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior 
(SJT format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety climate 
is stronger. 
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.03, p < .001), and 




for unique variance in the model (R
2 = 0.001, p = .702). Rather, safety climate 
average was the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the 
model. 
4b) The safety self-reported safety behavior (self-report format) - safety 
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate 
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior 
(self-report format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety 
climate is stronger. 
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.21, p < .001), and 
accounted for 41.1% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account 
for unique variance in the model (R
2 = 0.006, p = .387). Rather, safety climate 
average was the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the 
model. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Because few significant relationships existed within the proposed hypotheses 
when restricting the sample to the matched data (n = 197), exploratory analyses were 
conducted to determine whether individual components of the model could be supported 
when allowing all participants to be included in the analyses. Testing the model to the 
extent possible with the larger sample could help determine whether the non-significant 
results could be attributed to a lack of power.  
For example, although only six participants completed the pre-employment 




completed the pre-employment measures also had an accident/injury. Therefore, direct 
relationships between the personality-oriented or overt safety measures with objective 
safety outcomes could be examined. Likewise, 600 participants who completed the 
employee survey measures also had an accident/injury, facilitating exploration of the 
direct relationships between these variables. Lastly, a total of 17,395 participants 
completed the employee survey measures; thus, any relationships between the scales on 
the survey could be explored (i.e., safety performance, safety climate average and 
strength, subjective safety outcomes).  
Pre-employment measures as accident/injury predictors. A dichotomous 
outcome was created to indicate the presence of any kind of accident or injury; this 
enabled all three objective safety outcomes to be combined into a single, broader 
outcome. A series of logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the effects 
of the personality-oriented variables and the overt-safety variables on accident/injury 
occurrence. The demographic variables of race, gender, and age were always entered as 
categorical variables in Step 1 to control for their effects). (Tenure was removed from all 
logistic regressions as its inclusion drastically reduced the sample size; correlational 
analyses indicated that the removal of this variable was very unlikely to have an impact 
on the significance of subsequent analyses.) 
The R
2
L, or likelihood ratio, is reported for all logistic regression analyses, which 
is more powerful than a Wald test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The R
2
L is calculated by 
dividing the change in the  -2 Log Likelihood attributed to the target predictors by the -2 




total by the sum of squares model in ordinary least squares regression. The resulting 
value gives an indication of improvement in model fit, with a larger value indicating 
greater percent improvement in fit due to the predictor(s) (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 
2003).  
Personality-oriented variables. A direct logistic regression was conducted to 
determine if the three personality-based variables of safety locus of control, 
conscientiousness, and risk propensity were predictive of accident/injury occurrence. A 
test of the full model with all predictors against the model with the control variables was 
not statistically significant, χ
2
 (3, n = 213) = 4.923, p = .178, indicating that these 
predictors as a set could not reliability distinguish between employees who had an 
accident and those who did not. The likelihood ratio was low, R
2
L = .134. Tests of model 
effects from the generalized linear model indicated that none of the individual predictors 







p = .076; see Table 16).  
Overt safety variables. A direct logistic regression was conducted to determine if 
the two overt safety-oriented variables were predictive of any accident/injury occurrence. 
A test of the full model with all predictors against the control variables model was not 
statistically significant, χ
2
 (2, n = 213) = 0.94, p =.624. Tests of model effects from the 
generalized linear model indicated that none of the individual predictors significantly 
contributed to the model. The likelihood ratio was very low, R
2
L = .026 (see Table 17).  
Employee survey measures as objective safety predictors. A series of 




was related to the objective outcomes of restricted and missed work days of the model 
when employing the full data set. A logistic regression was used to determine whether 
safety performance was predictive of micro-accidents or any accident/injury. Further, 
average safety climate and safety climate strength were explored as predictors of micro-
accidents and any accident/injury. 
In each analysis, the demographic variables were entered as Step 1 to control for 
their effects. As described earlier, the dummy variable indicating if the participant was 
the only member of their group was entered as Step 2 to account for the nested nature of 
the data. 
Safety performance. As with the bootstrapping analyses, the six items from the 
safety compliance and safety participation scales were averaged to form a safety 
performance scale. This predictor was included instead of examining safety compliance 
and participation separately. The results suggested that safety performance was not a 
significant predictor of restricted work days, F (1, 591) = 0.5145, R
2
 = 0.001, p = .474, 
or missed work days F (1, 591) = 1.098, R
2
 = 0.002, p = .295 (see Table 18).  
A direct logistic regression was conducted to determine if safety performance was 
a significant predictor of micro-accidents. A test of the full model with all predictors 
against the control model was not statistically significant, χ
2
 (1, n = 598) = 3.49, p = .062 
(although it approached significance), indicating that these predictors as a set could not 
reliability distinguish between employees who had a micro-accident and those who did 
not. The likelihood ratio was very small, R
2




A logistic regression was also conducted to assess the impact of safety 
performance on any accident/injury occurrence. Although the overall model was 
significant, χ
2
 (18, n = 17,287) = 63.57, p < .001, the final step to test for safety 
performance was not significant, χ
2 
(1, n = 17,287) = 0.491,
 
p = .483. Rather, the 




p < .001). Specifically, employees 
aged 20-24 were 1.614 times more likely to not have an accident/injury than those under 
the age of 20 (the reference group) and those aged 45-49 were 1.58 times more likely to 
have an accident than those under 20. The likelihood ratio for this model was very small, 
R
2
L < .000 (see Table 20). 
Average safety climate. A direct logistic regression was conducted to determine 
whether average safety climate was predictive of micro-accidents; the analysis was 
restricted to groups with four or more members. Average safety climate was not a 
significant predictor, χ
2
 (1, n = 466) = 0.410, p = .522, indicating that the model was not 
able to distinguish between participants who had a micro-accident and those who did not. 
The likelihood ratio was very small, R
2
L = .001 (see Table 21).  
More broadly, a direct logistic regression was also conducted on accident/injury 
occurrence as an outcome; the analysis was restricted to groups with four or more 
members. Safety climate average did not contribute uniquely to the model, χ
2
 (1, n = 
13,615) = 0.160, p = .689; rather, the significant effects were primarily attributed to age, 
χ
2 
(n = 15,615) = 8.07,
 
p < .01. Specifically, employees between 30 and 34 years old 
were 1.67 times more likely to have an accident/injury than those under the age of 20 (the 




likely to have an accident/injury than those under the age of 20, respectively. The 
likelihood ratio for the model was very small, R
2
L < .000 (see Table 22). 
Safety climate strength. A logistic regression was also conducted to assess the 
impact of safety climate strength on micro-accidents, restricting analyses to groups with 
four or more members. Safety climate average was included to control for the variable’s 
valence. The model did not reach statistical significance, χ
2
 (1, n = 466) = 0.014, p = 
.905. The likelihood ratio was very small, R
2
L < .000 (see Table 23). 
More broadly, a logistic regression was also conducted to assess the impact of 
safety climate strength on any accident/injury occurrence. Safety climate strength did not 
contribute uniquely to the model, χ
2
 (1, n = 13,615) = 0.013, p = .909. The likelihood 
ratio was very small, R
2
L < .000 (see Table 24). 
Employee survey measures as safety performance predictors. A series of 
linear regressions were conducted to determine whether average safety climate or safety 
climate strength were related to safety performance, the proposed mediator, when 
employing the full data set. For each analysis, the demographic variables of race, age, 
gender, and tenure were entered as Step 1 to control for their effects and the group 
membership dummy variable was added as Step 2. Analyses were restricted to groups 
with four or more members. 
Average safety climate. The results suggested that the demographics and group 
membership did not account for significant variance in the outcome variable. Average 
safety climate uniquely explained 39.2% of the variance in safety performance, F (1, 
5102) = 3292.46, R
2




expected direction; namely, higher average safety climate was predictive of higher safety 
performance. 
Safety climate strength. For this analysis, safety climate average was entered as 
the third step to control for the valence of the variable. The results suggested that group 
safety climate strength was predictive of safety performance above and beyond 
demographics, group membership, and average safety climate, R
2 
= .002, p < .001.  The 
final model accounted for 39.6% of the variance in safety performance and the effect of 
the target variable was also in the expected direction. Namely, greater safety climate 
strength was associated with higher reports of safety performance (see Table 26).
1
  
Employee survey measures as subjective safety predictors. A series of linear 
regressions were conducted to determine whether the safety performance composite 
(safety compliance and participation average) was predictive of subjective safety 
outcomes when using the full set of data. Further, another series of linear regressions 
were conducted to determine whether average safety climate or safety climate strength 
were related to the subjective outcomes of the model when employing the full data set. 
As with the previous analyses, demographic variables were entered as Step 1 to control 
for their effects, the group membership dummy variable was added as Step 2. Analyses 
were restricted to groups with at least four members; pairwise deletion was used to 
prevent unnecessary restriction of the sample size. 
Safety performance. The results suggested that safety performance was predictive 
of all three subjective safety outcomes after controlling for demographics and group 
                                                 
1
 The interaction between safety climate average and safety climate strength was a significant predictor of 




membership, although the effect sizes were small. Namely, the model accounted for 0.9% 
of the variance in near-misses, F (1, 5160) = 34.48, R
2
 = .007, p < .001. Safety 
performance also explained 0.6% of the variance in minor injuries uniquely, with the 
complete model explaining a total of 0.8% of the variance in minor injuries, F (1, 5156) 
= 33.50, R
2
 = .006, p < .001. Lastly, 0.9% of the variance in MSK pain was explained 
by the complete model, F (1, 5160) = 49.68, R
2
 = .009, p < .001, all of which was 
uniquely attributed to the safety performance predictor (see Table 27).  
Average safety climate. Average safety climate was significantly predictive of 
near-misses, F (1, 5102) = 86.38, R
2
 = .017, p <.001. The final model accounted for 
1.9% of the variance in near-misses, with 1.7% solely due to safety climate average (p < 
.001). Average safety climate was also predictive of minor injuries, F (1, 5102) = 62.50, 
R
2
 = .012, p < .001, with the final model accounting for 1.4% of the variance in minor 
injuries. Average safety climate was also significantly related to MSK pain, F (1, 5102) 
= 134.68, R
2
 = .026, p < .001); the final model accounted for 2.6% of the variance in 
MSK pain, all of which was due to the safety climate average predictor (p < .001). All 
relationships were in the expected direction; namely, higher safety climate was related to 
lower reported near-misses, minor injuries, and MSK pain (see Table 25). 
Safety climate strength. For this analysis, safety climate average was entered as 
Step 3 to control for its valence. The results suggested that group-level safety climate 
strength did not significantly predict any of the subjective outcomes above and beyond 
safety climate average (near-miss, F (1, 5101) = 0.38, R
2 




injuries, F (1, 5101) = 0.51, R
2 
= .000, p = .476; MSK pain, F (1, 5101) = 0.00, R
2 
= 
.000, p = .993; see Table 26). 
Summary of significant relationships. Personality-oriented variables 
(conscientiousness, risk propensity, and safety locus of control) were predictive of MSK 
pain through safety performance. Safety climate average accounted for upwards of 40% 
of the outcome variance in safety performance, indicating that individuals working in 
climate geared towards safety are much more likely to engage in safety compliance and 
participation behaviors. Safety climate strength was also significantly related to safety 
performance above and beyond the effects of safety climate average (along with 
demographics and group membership), although the effects were quite small. 
Safety performance as a composite measure was predictive of all subjective safety 
outcomes (near-misses, minor injuries, and MSK pain). Safety climate average was also 
predictive of all three subjective safety outcomes. The practical implications of these 








Summary of Findings  
The current study examined the relationships that personality-oriented and overt 
safety variables had with objective and subjective safety outcomes, as operating through 
safety performance. The role of safety climate strength was also explored by including in 
the model as a moderator of the relationships that personality and overt safety predictors 
were hypothesized to have with subjective and objective safety outcomes. The following 
section will detail the tests of these hypotheses along with the exploratory analyses 
conducted ad hoc. 
Hypothesis tests. The first set of hypotheses stated that the positive relationships 
that the three personality variables were expected to have with safety outcomes would be 
mediated by safety performance. Because safety compliance and participation could not 
reliability be differentiated, they were combined to form a safety performance composite.  
Tests of indirect effects with objective safety outcomes (restricted work days, 
missed work days, and micro-accidents) could not be tested due to low sample size. For 
the subjective outcomes, this hypothesis was only supported when MSK pain was the 
outcome; indirect relationships with minor injuries or near-misses as the dependent 
variables were not significant. Further, none of the direct relationships between the 
personality variables and the safety outcomes were significant. This may provide some 
evidence for MSK pain as the most sensitive safety outcome and also highlights the 




also important to note that in suppression was present in these relationships; namely, the 
indirect relationship between the personality predictors and MSK pain were artificially 
inflated by the negative and significant safety performance-MSK pain relationship 
(MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Therefore, these results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Another possible interpretation of these findings is that personality-based 
measures may have greater utility than overt variables in predicting post-hire safety 
behaviors. It is possible that the overt items were too transparent, and that applicants 
could easily determine the “right” answer on the assessments, increasing their ability to 
distort their responses to match the most desirable answer. This notion is in line with a 
meta-analysis conducted by Alliger and Dwight (2000), who found that while scores on 
both personality-based and overt integrity tests can be by coaching and instructions to 
fake, personality-based tests were more resistant to both. This resistance would force 
applicants to answer honestly and would likely increase the variability in responses, 
increasing the likelihood to detect significant relationships between assessment scores 
and safety outcomes. 
The second set of hypotheses proposed the same mediated relationships with the 
two overt safety variables as the predictors. Neither the direct nor the indirect 
hypothesized relationships reached statistical significance. Although many other studies 
have included safety performance as direct predictor of safety outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 




other relevant variables could have explained additional variance in the proposed 
relationships (this area will be explored further below). 
The third (3a-c) and fourth (4a-b) sets of hypotheses stated that the positive 
relationships that the personality-related and overt safety variables have with safety 
performance would be moderated by group-level safety climate strength. Specifically, the 
predictor-criterion relationships were hypothesized to be weaker when safety climate is 
stronger due to the diminishing effect that strong situations have on the variance of 
individual differences (Beaty et al., 2001).  
Variance at the group level was a pre-requisite to test these relationships. The 
ICC(1) was low, indicating that what little variation existed in safety climate average was 
attributed mostly to the individual and not to the group to which the employee belonged. 
This was also seen in the low standard deviation of safety climate strength (SD = 0.229). 
However, one-way ANOVAs indicated that the group in which an employee worked was 
significantly related to their safety climate average and strength. Thus, although group 
effects were small, they were present nonetheless. Despite variance existing at Level 2, 
insufficient sample size at both levels prevented the testing of these analyses using 
multilevel models as initially proposed in the current study. Linear multiple regression 
was used to test these hypotheses with the inclusion of a group membership dummy 
variable to partially address the nested data.  
The results of these hypothesis tests indicated that the interaction between any of 
the personality variables with safety climate strength did not uniquely predict safety 




step that significantly accounted for unique variance in these models, accounting for 39% 
of the variance in safety performance. Likewise, the interaction between both overt safety 
variables and safety climate strength did not significantly predict safety performance.  
The fact that no significant moderating relationships were found makes 
conceptual sense when considering their basis. Namely, the hypotheses were founded on 
the notion that individual personalities play a larger role in weak versus strong situations. 
Whereas strong situations elicit uniform behavior, weak situations should result in a 
greater variability in behavioral responses (Mischel, 1973, 1976; Schneider et al., 2002). 
This variability allows for greater expression of personality because employees rely on 
their predispositions to dictate appropriate behavior since the situation is not specifying it 
outright (Beaty et al., 2001). The safety climate in the current study was quite strong, as 
evidenced by a low standard deviation of safety climate average in the unique 
department-within-store groups (SD = 0.229, n = 13,615). Therefore, the fact that 
personality by safety climate strength interactions did not emerge is in line with the 
theory of situational strength. The findings could also indicate that, at least in the current 
study’s sample, the employees’ environment had a stronger effect on their safety 
perceptions and behavior than their personalities.  
Exploratory analyses. Because few significant relationships existed within the 
proposed hypotheses when restricting the sample to the matched data (n = 197), 
exploratory analyses were conducted to determine whether individual components of the 
model could be supported when allowing all participants to be included in the analyses. 




help determine whether the non-significant results could be attributed to a lack of 
statistical power. 
First, a series of logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
effects of the personality-oriented variables and the overt-safety variables on any 
accident/injury occurrence. The model with the personality predictors was not 
statistically significant, but conscientiousness as a predictor did approach significance. 
The same analysis with the overt-safety predictors was non-significant. 
Second, because the objective outcomes could not be tested using the matched 
data only, employee survey measures were examined as predictors of the objective safety 
outcomes using the entire data set. Safety performance was not a significant predictor of 
restricted or missed work days, or of accident/injury occurrence. However, safety 
performance did approach significance with micro-accidents as the dependent variable. 
Significant relationships were more likely to be found with micro-accidents as the 
dependent variable in comparison to accidents and injuries because the latter are 
statistically rare events and are therefore more likely to present skewed distributions 
(Zohar, 2000). Thus, micro-accidents are considered to be a more fine-grained safety 
measure that may more adequately tap the subtle nuances of safety (Lingard, Cooke, & 
Blismas, 2010). 
Logistic regression analyses suggested that average safety climate was not 
predictive of micro-accidents or any accident/injury occurrence. Likewise, safety climate 




Third, employee survey measures (average safety climate and safety climate 
strength) were examined as predictors of safety performance. Average safety climate was 
a strong predictor of safety performance, accounting for over 39% of the variance in this 
outcome after controlling for demographics and group membership. The strong 
relationship between safety climate average and safety performance indicates that that 
individuals working in climate geared towards safety are much more likely to engage in 
safety compliance and participation behaviors. Safety climate strength was also 
predictive of safety performance above and beyond the effects of safety climate average 
(along with demographics and group membership); however, the effects were small (R
2 
= .002, p < .001). 
Lastly, employee survey measures were examined as predictors of subjective 
safety outcomes (near-miss, minor injuries, and MSK pain). Safety performance as a 
composite measure was predictive of all subjective safety outcomes (near-misses, minor 
injuries, and MSK pain). However, the amount of variance accounted for by safety 
performance was less than 1% for all three of the respective outcomes. Safety climate 
average was also predictive of all three subjective safety outcomes, uniquely accounting 
for a slightly higher amount of unique variance, ranging from 1.2% for minor injuries and 
2.6% for MSK pain. Safety climate strength did not account for additional variance above 
and beyond safety climate average. 
The reminder of this chapter will begin with a description of the limitations of the 




be also discussed. Lastly, the strengths of the current study and an explanation of how the 
study contributes to this field of research will conclude the chapter. 
Limitations & Directions for Future Research 
 Despite the many strengths of the design of the current study, few significant 
relationships were found between the variables of interest; this may be due to the 
limitations of the study. These potential limitations as well as opportunities for mitigating 
them in future studies are explored below. 
It is likely that the most damaging limitation to the current study was low sample 
size for matched participants. Despite the fact that 20,470 applicants completed the pre-
employment measures and 17,395 employees completed the survey measures, only 197 
completed both. Furthermore, a mere six of these individuals had an accident/injury; thus, 
the full model could not be tested as designed. Although the pre-employment measures 
were supposed to be introduced in November 2011, logistical complications with the 
grocery store sample and the talent management company managing the application 
process prevented their introduction until March 2012. Therefore, only two months of 
pre-employment data could be collected, as opposed to the five months proposed in the 
original design (only employees who had been hired before May 2012 were eligible to 
take the yearly employee survey in June 2012). A longer data collection period would 
have increased the number of individuals who completed all measures and would have 
also increased the time period of which hired individuals could have had an 




longer time period due to the low base rate nature of accidents (Burke & Signal, 2010) 
and to allow for unforeseen logistical constraints. 
 Another limitation may have been the extensive messaging from the grocery 
chain around safety. Although the intent was to help employees understand the inclusion 
of the new survey measures, the heavy emphasis on safety may have affected responses 
to survey items. Namely, employees are aware that the survey is confidential but not 
anonymous and that answers could in fact be linked back to the individual if the company 
desired to do so. Employees may have refrained from answering completely honestly 
about any unsafe behaviors for fear of punishment. Low variability in safety outcome 
measures clearly affects likelihood to detect significant effects, so it is possible that 
reports of unsafe behaviors or outcomes would be larger if a separate survey was 
conducted apart from the annual employee survey.  
 In fact, under-reporting of safety incidents has been found to occur frequently in 
studies of this nature. Probst, Brubaker, and Barsotti (2008) conducted a study to 
determine whether data from OSHA logs kept by construction contractor companies 
differed from those kept by the insurance companies who received their respective 
medical claims. The authors found that the companies’ had far fewer reports less than the 
insurance companies. Specifically, the results suggested that “while the annual injury rate 
reported to OSHA was 3.11 injuries per 100 workers, the rate of eligible injuries that 
were not reported to OSHA was 10.90 injuries per 100 employees” (p. 1147).  
Underreporting was especially prevalent when companies had lower safety climate 




poor safety climate compared to 47% in organizations with a high safety climate. 
Similarly, Morse et al. (2005) found musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) to be 
underreported, with only 1,259 out of 21,500 MSD cases reported to the Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs or to the Occupational Disease Surveillance System. 
Future research could attempt to log safety incidents through other means (e.g., safety 
checks by supervisors) or could try to statistically correct for underreporting. 
The current study proposed that the positive relationships that the three 
personality and overt safety variables were expected to have with safety outcomes would 
be mediated by safety performance; however, these hypotheses were not supported. 
Although many other studies have included safety performance as direct predictor of 
safety outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2006b; Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001), it is 
possible that the inclusion of other relevant variables could have explained additional 
variance in the proposed relationships.  
For example, in a study conducted in India with 1,566 employees, Vinokdumar 
and Bhasi (2010) found self-reported safety knowledge and safety motivation to be the 
key mediators in explaining the relationships that safety management practices had with 
safety compliance and safety participation. Safety knowledge was measured by five items 
such as “I know how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the workplace.” 
Safety motivation was also measured by five items, such as “I feel it is important to 
encourage others to use safe practices.”  In their final model, the authors showed safety 
motivation to have a strong relationship with safety compliance (r = .48, p < .01) and 




the two outcomes, safety compliance (r = .13, p < .01) and participation (r = .25, p < .01). 
The authors concluded that the study “suggests that to get positive results in terms of 
safety compliance and participation safety management practices … must be designed to 
produce changes in safety knowledge and motivation of the workers” (p. 2092). 
Similarly, Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000) found the relationship between safety climate 
and safety performance was mediated by safety knowledge and motivation. The same 
mediating relationship was found by Griffin and Neal (2000). 
Future researchers could test the current model and also include another mediator, 
safety attitudes. Safety attitudes are the beliefs and emotions an individual holds 
regarding safety policies and practices (Neal & Griffin, 2004; Rundmo & Hale, 2003). 
These attitudes also include how the committed the individual is to safety and the degree 
of personal responsibility he/she feels towards it (Henning et al., 2008). Importantly, 
safety attitudes are the product of both individual differences and the environment (Neal 
& Griffin, 2004). Henning et al. (2008) conducted a study with 190 university students; 
the authors found that certain individual differences (i.e., agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, prevention regulatory focus, fatalism) to significantly predict safety 
attitudes. The authors stated that their findings “suggest individuals who are ‘riskier’ in 
their personalities hold more negative safety attitudes, and previous research suggests 
individuals with higher levels of these traits tend to … experience more accidents” (p. 
344). Therefore, the inclusion of safety attitudes as an additional mediator may explain 






The current study explored the role of personality-based and overt safety-related 
variables as predictors of subjective and objective outcomes. Although none of the 
independent variables were significant predictors of the outcomes included in the study, 
conscientiousness did approach significance when examined as an antecedent of 
accident/injury occurrence. This highlights the integral role that human resource 
professionals can play in reducing occupational accidents and injuries. When a company 
implements safety-related practices, the importance of safety is conveyed to employees, 
which should orient their actions to behave in a safer manner (Neal & Griffin, 2004). 
Hiring individuals oriented to behave safely on the job is one such practice. In fact, the 
selection process has been deemed the “first line of defense an organization has against 
hiring unsafe workers;” namely, riskier candidates can be screened out or placed in less 
hazardous positions (Forcier et al., 2001, p. 62). Moreover, once an organization 
establishes itself as a safety-conscious workplace, candidates who are inclined to work 
safely should be drawn to this organization, further developing a culture of safety 
(Vrendenburgh, 2002).  
The present study built upon existing safety climate literature by replicating the 
relationship between average safety climate and safety performance (e.g., Neal, Griffin, 
& Hart, 2000; Pousette, Larsson, & Törner, 2008). The fact that safety climate strength 
significantly predicted safety performance also extends research literature in this 
relatively unexplored area behavior. Further, the results of correlational analyses 




work days due to an accident/injury. To date, only a single study found has examined 
safety climate strength an antecedent of safety behavior (i.e., Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas, 
2010). Lingard et al. (2010) found that safety climates that are weak are also more likely 
to be low (i.e., safety is a low priority), whereas strong climates were more likely to be 
high.  
Thus, even the small effects found in the current study demonstrate the utility of 
this construct for explaining additional variance around safety-related outcomes. 
Practitioners should be aware, therefore, not only of the valence of the safety climate 
within organizational groups, but should also take into account the strength of that 
climate, taking care to improve both. Having a single employee with divergent climate 
perceptions could possibly derail the whole group, as climate perceptions are theorized to 
shape through social interaction with colleagues (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 
2010). This theory is supported by research that demonstrates that social influence from 
interacting with others leads to changes in individual’s feelings and behaviors (Rashotte, 
2007). A strong safety climate reflects less ambiguity regarding organizational safety 
practices and increases the cohesiveness of group perceptions and expectations (Dickson, 
Resick, & Hanges, 2006). It also reduces the likelihood that strong personalities could 
have negative outcomes, since individual discretion becomes less salient in a strong 
situation, where many cues provide information about how to behave (Hattrup & 
Jackson, 1996; Meyer, Dalal & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1977).  
 Safety performance, along with safety climate average, was also found to be a 




MSK pain). The direct relationship between safety performance and micro-accidents also 
approached significance. This highlights that organizations should take note of how 
employees behave with respect to the formally mandated safety component of an 
employee’s job as well as the informal extra-role behaviors. The former directly 
contributes to workplace safety (e.g., wearing personal protective equipment) whereas the 
latter indirectly contributes it by creating a safety-supportive environment (e.g., attending 
safety meetings; Griffin & Neal, 2000). 
Strengths & Contribution of the Current Study 
 Many design elements of the current study were chosen in line with best practices 
for sound research. The study drew from existing integrity research to apply the overt vs. 
personality-based distinction to safety variables. Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and 
Odle-Dusseau (2012) conducted an extensive meta-analytic study to examine the 
criterion-related validity evidence from 104 studies representing 134 independent 
samples, aiming to explore the “perceived lack of methodological rigor” within the 
integrity testing literature. The results indicated that criterion-related validities differed 
significantly according to features of the study design. The article stated, “it has been 
suggested that the most relevant validity evidence for integrity tests and counter-
productive work behavior comes from studies that use predictive designs, applicant 
samples, and non-self-report criteria” (p. 518).  
The current study employed each one of these elements, with the goal of detecting 
the soundest evidence for relationships between safety-related variables. Specifically, 




design, as opposed to single-reports using student participants or a convenience sample, 
as is commonly done. Safety-related pre-employment measures were completed by 
applicants but were not used in determining their hiring potential, reducing possible 
effects of range restriction. Outcome variables were gathered at a later date, employing a 
longitudinal component and thereby reducing common method bias and facilitating an 
exploration of true causation. Lastly, objective accident/injury data was gathered from 
OSHA records to negate limitations associated with self-report criteria.  
Another strength of the current study is the proposed theoretical approach and 
analytic strategy. House et al. (1995) argues that researchers must adopt a “meso 
paradigm” in order to form integrated organizational theories. The authors explain that a 
meso paradigm links macro and micro concepts in studies, and according to their 
research, the majority of published articles fail to take into account. There are multiple 
ways a study can embrace the meso paradigm; the current study adopts the multilevel 
effects type, where effects from two levels (individual and group) are examined as 
interrelated concepts. The multilevel theoretical perspective included in the current study 
is especially important given that workplace safety literature has not typically employed 
this approach (Burke & Signal, 2010).  
Furthermore, the current study addressed a deficiency noted by Wallace and Chen 
(2006), which is the incorporation of both personal and situational antecedents in safety 
literature. The use of both the employee and the environment as predictors of workplace 
safety is important, as work accidents have been stated to be the result of a complex 




In sum, although few significant relationships were found in the current study due 
to low sample size associated with logistical constraints, it may serve as an example of 
how empirical research can and should adopt best practices for study design, theoretical 
approach, and analytic strategy. It is also important to note these elements far outweigh 
the statistical non-significance of the results. In a recent article in the “The Industrial-
Organizational Psychologist,” a SIOP publication, Mills and Woo (2012) emphasize the 
substantial impact that sample size has on the likelihood of finding statistical 
significance, concluding that empirical researchers “must value all well-designed 
research, regardless of whether or not the results are statistically significant” (p. 52). The 
authors also noted that replication is the true key to the advancement of science and that it 
is the establishment of a pattern that lays the groundwork for valuable insights. Future 
researchers are encouraged, therefore, to test and re-test the relationships in this important 
area of research while employing the soundest of research methods to gain a truer 







































Figure 1: The hypothesized model (condensed version). 
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Table 1: Safety Locus of Control Items 
 Item Modified from: Response scale 
Scale: SLOC_Likert 
1* Preventing accidents in the 
workplace is the responsibility 
of the company. (Reverse 
scored) 
Jones & Webker  
(1993) 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
2 Avoiding accidents at work is 
a matter of having good luck. 
(Reverse scored) 
Jones & Webker 
(1993) 
Idem 
3 It is pointless to follow safety 
requirements that are unrelated 
to the job. (Reverse scored) 
Janicak (1996) Idem 
4 The average employee can 
play a role in accident 
prevention at work. 
Janicak (1996) Idem 
5 One of the major reasons why 
accidents occur is because 
employees don't take enough 
interest in safety. 
Janicak (1996) Idem 
6 It is hard to have control over 
the things that cause accidents 
at work. (Reverse scored) 
Janicak (1996) Idem 
Scale: SLOC_Rational 
7 Who is responsible for 
ensuring that safe work 




1 = Safety experts 
2 = Supervisors 
3 = Managers 
4 = Safety Trainers 
5 = Employees  
8 When two people are involved 
in an accident, how often is it 




1 = Always 
2 = Often 
3 = Sometimes 
4 = Rarely 
5 = Never 









Table 2: Risk Propensity Items 
 Item Modified from: Response scale 
Scale: Risk_Likert 




1 =  Strongly Agree  
2 =  Agree  
3 = Neutral 
4 =  Disagree 
5 =  Strongly Disagree 





3 I don't mind taking risks at work 
even when there is a small 




4 I usually view risks as a 
challenge. 
Meertens et al. 
(2008) 
Idem 
5 I prefer to avoid taking risks at 
work.  (Reverse scored) 




6 How often do you act on 





1 = Always 
2 = Often 
3 = Sometimes 
4 = Rarely 
5 = Never 





1 = Always 
2 = Often 
3 = Sometimes 
4 = Rarely 
5 = Never 
8 In my ideal job, people 
sometimes make decisions and 
actions in a quick manner 
without analyzing all the 
information or take risks to 
move people or the business 




1 = Most desirable 
2 = Somewhat 
desirable 
3 = Neither 
4 = Somewhat 
undesirable 




Table 3: Conscientiousness Items 
 Item Modified from: Response scale 
Scale: Conscientiousness_Likert 
Others would say …  
1 I do a thorough job. John & 
Srivastava 
(1999) 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
2 I persevere on a task 













5 I follow through with 






1 In my ideal job, the 
organization considers 
many data points and 
thoroughly evaluates 
issues and it is important 
to have work completed 
without errors even at 




1 = Most desirable 
2 = Somewhat desirable 
3 = Neither 
4 = Somewhat undesirable 
5 = Most undesirable 
2 What would others say 





1 = Works much harder than 
others 
2 = Works harder than others 
3 = Works as hard as others 
4 = Works less than others 
5 = Works much less than 
others 
3 How would others rate 





1 = Much more error free 
than others 
2 = More error free than 
others 
3 = About the same as others 




cross-check work for 
accuracy 
5 =  Never been solely 
responsible for producing 
error free work 
4 How often do you think 
you will be absent from 
work this year (not 




1 = Never 
2 = Once or twice 
3 = Three of four times 
4 = Five or more times 
5 Which of the following 





1 = I enjoy straightening 
things up so they look nice. 
2 = I am messy, but I keep 
things clean. 
3 = I don't care much about 
keeping things neat or clean. 
4 = I think keeping things 
neat and tidy is a waste of 
time. 
6 Compared to others, 





1 = Much more thoroughly 
than others 
2 = More thoroughly than 
others 
3 = About the same as others 
4 = Less thoroughly than 
others 
5 = Much less thoroughly 
than others 
7 How would you like to 





1 = Something not listed 
above 
2 = Fun to work with 
3 = Knowledgeable 
4 = Helpful 







Table 4: Overt Safety Items 




1 I follow safety rules 
with few reminders. 
Created 1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
2 I believe in "safety 
first." 
Created Idem 
3 I believe it's 
acceptable to bend 
or break safety rules 




4* I don't believe the 
same safety rules 




5 You know you are 
supposed to wear 
personal protective 
equipment (PPE) for 
a task you must 
complete. However, 
it is uncomfortable 
and seems 
unnecessary. What 
do you do? 
Created 1 = Ask your supervisor for a 
different task. 
2 = Complete the task but not 
wear the PPE. 
3 = Only wear the PPE when your 
supervisor is around. 
4 = Wear the PPE until you get 
too uncomfortable. 
5 = Wear the PPE for the duration 
of the task 
6 You see a coworker 
breaking a safety 
rule. What would 
you do? 
Created 1 = Nothing 
2 = It depends on whether the rule 
is really necessary. 
3 = Tell the supervisor. 
4 = Wait for another coworker to 
come by so you can approach the 
employee together. 
5 = Immediately approach the 
employee to tell him/her that a 




7 One hour before 
your shift ends your 
supervisor tells you 
to complete some 
additional work. 
This work will take 
you 2 hours to 
complete if you 
follow the safety 
procedures. Some of 
the safety procedures 
are probably not 
needed to complete 
this task. What 




1 = Complete the work without 
following any of the safety 
procedures 
2 = For each safety issue, 
carefully consider the risks 
involved 
3 = Pay attention to the really 
serious safety procedures but 
ignore those you think are 
unnecessary 
4 = Follow all safety procedures 
and do as much as you can till 
your shift ends, then tell your 
supervisor you can't finish the 
work 
5 = Tell your supervisor 
immediately that you won't be 
able to finish the work by the 
time your shift ends 
8 You were late for 
work and your 
supervisor has been 
watching you closely 
today. Your last job 
duty is to tag and 
move some heavy 
product. Safety rules 
state you should do 
this work with 
another person, but 
nobody is available. 
If you don't get the 
work done now your 
shift will end and 
you will have 
assigned work 
unfinished. What 




1 = Ask your supervisor to 
temporarily suspend the safety 
rule until you finish your work 
2 = Get another employee to say 
he helped you even though he 
didn't 
3 = Complete the work keeping 
careful watch for others so you 
don't get caught 
4 = Wait for your supervisor to 
tell you what to do 
5 = Tell your supervisor you can't 
finish the work until tomorrow 










Table 5: Safety Climate Items 
 Source: 
Modified from 
Zohar & Luria 
(2005) 
Response Scale 
1 = Strongly 
Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
 My department manager… 
1 Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job safely. 
2 Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying the safety rules. 
3 Discusses how to improve safety with us. 
4 Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely. 
5 Emphasizes safety procedures when we are working under pressure. 
6 Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule. 
7 Makes sure we follow all the safety rules (not just the most important 
ones). 
8 Says a “good word” to workers who pay special attention to safety. 
9 Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards. 
10 Quickly corrects any safety hazard (even if it’s costly). 




Table 6: Safety Performance Items 
Safety Compliance 
 My coworkers would say… Source Response Scale 
1 I use all the necessary safety 
equipment to do my job. 
Neal & Griffin 
(2004) 
1 = Strongly 
Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
2 I use the correct safety 
procedures for carrying out my 
job. 
Neal & Griffin 
(2004) 
Idem 






1 I put in extra effort to improve 
the safety of the workplace. 
Neal & Griffin 
(2004) 
Idem 
2 I point out to management any 
safety related matters that I 
notice. 




3 I assist others to make sure they 
perform their work safely. 










Table 7: Subjective Safety Outcomes Items 




In the last year, how many 
work-related near misses (an 
incident that could have 
resulted in an injury but did 
not) have you experienced at 
[store name]? 
Modified from 
Goldenhar, et al. 
(2003) 
1 = None 
2 = 1-2 
3 = 3-4 
4 = 5-6 
5 = 7 or more 
Minor 
Injuries 
In the last year, how many 
times did you have a minor 
injury (cut, scrape, etc.) that 
did not require treatment? 
Modified from 
Sinclair, Martin, 
& Sears (2010) 
 
1 = None 
2 = 1-2 
3 = 3-4 
4 = 5-6 




In the last year, how many 




refer to a variety of injuries 
and illnesses, including:  
Muscle strains and back 
injuries that occur from 
repeated use or overexertion. 
Symptoms include pain in the 
hands, arms, shoulders, neck, 
back, legs or feet, and may 
include swelling, numbness, 
tingling and a feeling of 
heaviness in the affected area. 
Modified from 
Sinclair, Martin, 
& Sears (2010) 
 
1 = None 
2 = 1-3 
3 = 4-6 
4 = 7-9 





Table 8: Descriptive statistics, Individual-level inter-correlations, and Reliability statistics.  
    N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Safety Locus of Control – Likert
1
 197 4.50 0.45 (.651)           
2 Risk Propensity - Likert 197 4.26 0.71 .476** (.794)         
3 Conscientiousness - Likert 197 4.74 0.35 .460** .372** (.763)       
4 Overt Safety - Self-Report Format
1
 197 4.78 0.37 .454** .356** .531** (.509)     
5 Overt Safety- SJT Format 197 4.32 0.44 0.128 0.121 0.092 0.082 (.325)   
6 Group Safety Climate Average 196 4.52 0.65 0.079 0.040 0.093 -0.014 -0.008 (.969) 
7 Group Safety Climate Strength
2
 188 0.68 0.23 -0.028 0.051 0.059 0.092 -0.007 -.147* 
8 Safety Performance 197 4.65 0.49 .213** .176* .215** 0.130 -0.062 .615** 
9 Near-Misses 197 1.10 0.30 0.023 -0.024 -0.081 -0.026 0.071 -0.103 
10 Minor Injuries 197 1.30 0.73 0.080 0.025 0.072 0.068 -0.069 -0.087 
11 Work-Related MSK Pain 197 1.47 0.94 0.046 0.064 -0.015 0.049 -0.012 -.396** 
12 Missed Work Days 6 6.67 12.82 0.248 0.332 -0.697 0.255 .968** 0.361 
13 Restricted Work Days 6 5.33 13.06 -0.417 0.446 0.463 0.200 -0.333 0.445 
14 Micro-Accidents 6 0.67 0.52 -0.440 -0.217 0.266 -0.316 -0.802 -0.064 
* Correlation is significant at p < .05 (two-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at p < .01 (two-tailed) 
1
Reflects modified scales   
2










Table 8 (continued): Descriptive statistics, Individual-level Inter-correlations, and Reliability statistics.  
    N Mean SD 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Safety Locus of Control – Likert
1
 197 4.50 0.45               
2 Risk Propensity - Likert 197 4.26 0.71               
3 Conscientiousness - Likert 197 4.74 0.35               
4 Overt Safety - Self-Report Format
1
 197 4.78 0.37               
5 Overt Safety- SJT Format 197 4.32 0.44               
6 Group Safety Climate Average 196 4.52 0.65               
7 Group Safety Climate Strength
2
 188 0.68 0.23               
8 Safety Performance 197 4.65 0.49 -0.018 (.944)           
9 Near-Misses 197 1.10 0.30 -0.096 -0.055           
10 Minor Injuries 197 1.30 0.73 0.052 0.025 .296**         
11 Work-Related MSK Pain 197 1.47 0.94 0.141 -.289** .227** .318**       
12 Missed Work Days 6 6.67 12.82 -.812* 0.255 .968** 0.403 .866*     
13 Restricted Work Days 6 5.33 13.06 -0.159 0.200 -0.200 -0.632 -0.400 -0.255   
14 Micro-Accidents 6 0.67 0.52 0.685 -0.316 -0.632 -0.500 -0.791 -0.806 0.316 
* Correlation is significant at p < .05 (two-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at p < .01 (two-tailed) 
1
Reflects modified scales   
2







Table 9: Demographics of Matched Participants 
Age N % 
Under 20 years of age 44 22.3 
20 to 24 years of age 53 26.9 
25 to 29 years of age 15 7.6 
30 to 34 years of age 13 6.6 
35 to 39 years of age 11 5.6 
40 to 44 years of age 10 5.1 
45 to 49 years of age 14 7.1 
50 to 54 years of age 14 7.1 
55 to 59 years of age 11 5.6 
60 years of age or older 12 6.1 
Gender     
Males 110 55.8 
Females 87 44.2 
Race / Ethnicity     
White 126 64.0 
Black or African American 52 26.4 
Hispanic or Latino 9 4.6 
Asian 7 3.6 
American Indian or Alaska Native 2 1.0 
Two or more races 1 0.5 
Department     
Front-end – Cashier 94 47.7 
Front-end – Bagger 10 5.1 
Front-end – Accounting  1 0.5 
Front-end – Customer Service  1 0.5 
Grocery – Stock Crew 24 12.2 
Fresh Foods (Deli/ Bakery) 41 20.8 
Meat 3 1.5 
Seafood 1 0.5 
Produce 14 7.1 
Floral 6 3.0 
Dairy/ Frozen 2 1.0 






Table 9 (continued): Demographics of Matched Participants 
Tenure N % 
0 days – 45 days of service 58 29.4 














Conscientiousness - Likert 0.763 n/a 
Conscientiousness - Rational 0.579 Scale Not Used 
Risk Propensity - Likert 0.794 n/a 
Risk Propensity - Rational 0.418 Scale Not Used 
Safety Locus of Control - Likert 0.566 0.651 SLOC.1 
Safety Locus of Control - 
Rational 
-0.157 Scale Not Used 
Overt Safety - Likert 0.486 0.509 OSafe.4 






Table 10.2: Confirmatory Factor Analyses on Personality-Oriented Variables 
Model 
Number Model Description Chi-Square CFI RMSEA 
1 
All personality items clustered into 
respective scales (i.e., Safety Locus of 
Control, Risk Propensity, 
Conscientiousness) 
561.48, p <.001 0.84 0.06 
2 
Personality items clustered by response 
option (i.e., SLOC-Likert, SLOC-
Rational, Risk-Likert, Risk-Rational, 
Consc.-Likert, Consc.-Rational) 




Personality items clustered by response 
option with low-reliability item removed 
(SLOC-Likert item #1) 
121.88, p < .01 0.96 0.05 
Notes: SLOC = Safety Locus of Control, Consc. = Conscientiousness, CFI = Comparative 






Table 11: VIF and Tolerance Test to Check Multicollinearity with all Predictors 










1 Group Size .028 .001 1.00 1.00 
2 







Conscientiousness(Likert) .665 1.504 
Overt safety - Self-report 
format 
.660 1.514 
Overt safety- SJT format .942 1.061 
Notes: n = 197; a two-step hierarchical linear regression was conducted in 
order to partially account for group size and maintain consistency with the 













Table 12: Tests of Safety Performance as Mediators of the Personality-Based Safety - Safety Outcomes Relationships. 




95% CI for c' Indirect 
effects 
(a*b) 
95% CI for a*b Total 
effects 







-0.502 -1.790 0.786 -0.080 -0.451 0.157 -0.582 5,000 
Minor 
injuries 
0.147 -0.164 0.457 0.003 -0.073 0.063 0.150 80,000 
MSK pain 0.112 -0.256 0.481 -0.136 -0.350 -0.025 -0.024 5,000 







-0.034 -0.705 0.636 -0.039 -0.204 0.044 -0.075 5,000 
Minor 
injuries 
0.050 -0.103 0.203 0.002 -0.026 0.029 0.052 5,000 
MSK pain 0.145 -0.035 0.326 -0.057 -0.150 -0.008 0.088 5,000 
                      







0.494 -0.637 1.625 -0.085 -0.399 0.084 0.407 5,000 
Minor 
injuries 
0.140 -0.098 0.378 0.002 -0.059 0.050 0.142 
100,000
* 
MSK pain 0.186 -0.097 0.469 -0.104 -0.268 -0.019 0.083 5,000 
n = 197 
IV = independent variable; M = mediator; DV = dependent variable  









Table 13: Tests of Safety Performance as Mediators of the Overt Safety - Safety Outcomes Relationships. 




95% CI for c' Indirect 
effects 
(a*b) 
95% CI for a*b 
Total 
effects (c)  Samples Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Overt Safety 
- SJT format 
Safety 
Performance 
Near-misses 0.429 -0.632 1.489 0.034 -0.048 0.253 0.462 5,000 
Minor 
injuries 
-0.096 -0.330 0.139 -0.002 -0.039 0.022 -0.098 5,000 







Near-misses 0.037 -1.222 1.296 -0.045 -0.359 0.048 -0.008 5,000 
Minor 
injuries 
0.105 -0.182 0.391 0.003 -0.026 0.061 0.108 5,000 
MSK pain 0.262 -0.076 0.601 -0.063 -0.229 0.037 0.199 5,000 
n = 197 
IV = independent variable; M = mediator; DV = dependent variable  





Table 14: Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Personality Variables x Safety Climate Strength in Predicting Safety Performance 
  
Model 1   Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Total 

















 0.002 0.004 0.391 0.005 0.000 0.403 
(β) 0.015 -0.040 0.005 0.018 -0.069 0.638*** 0.071 -0.006 -0.064   
  










 0.006 0.003 0.407 







SLOC x SCS   
R
2
 0.006 0.004 0.408 
(β)   -0.037 0.260   
SCS = Safety Climate Strength, SLOC = Safety Locus of Control 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 







Table 15: Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Overt Safety Variables x Safety Climate Strength in Predicting Safety Performance 
  
Model 1   Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Total 

















 0.002 0.004 0.391 0.005 0.001 0.404 
(β) 0.015 -0.040 0.005 0.018 -0.069 0.638*** 0.071 0.024 -0.107   
  









 0.008 0.006 0.411 
(β)   0.057 -0.289   
SCS = Safety Climate Strength 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 











Table 16: Logistic Regression of Personality-Oriented Variables Predicting Likelihood of 
Accidents/Injuries 
Variables 





95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant 13.921 6136.951 -- -- -- -- 
Race -18.428 6136.951 4.470* 0.000 0.000 a 
Gender -0.293 0.967 0.092 0.746 0.112 4.970 
Age 0.100 0.145 0.472 1.106 0.833 1.468 
Group Size 1.339 1.459 1.050 3.814 0.219 66.513 
Safety LOC -2.208 4.203 0.262 0.110 0.000 415.873 
Risk Propensity -0.400 2.226 0.031 0.670 0.009 52.539 
Conscientiousness -6.426 3.597 3.142 0.002 0.000 1.869 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 4.92, df = 3, n = 213, R
2
L = 0.134, 
Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 54.67, Control Model -2LL = 36.75, Final Model -2 LL 
= 31.84. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely restricted sample size; 
separate analyses indicated it did not significantly predict accident/injury occurrence. a = Set to 




Table 17: Logistic Regression of Overt Safety Variables Predicting Likelihood of 
Accidents/Injuries 





95% CI for Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant 15.33 6398.586 -- -- -- -- 
Race -18.312 6398.586 5.210* 0.00 0.00 .a 
Gender (males) -0.484 0.9144 0.282 0.616 0.103 3.699 
Age 0.114 0.1356 0.694 1.121 0.859 1.462 
Group Size 0.160 0.9777 0.027 1.173 0.173 7.972 
Overt Safety - Likert 2.694 2.5092 1.177 14.794 0.108 2022.725 
Overt Safety - 
Rational -0.657 1.3821 0.274 0.518 0.035 7.781 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.93, df = 2, n = 213, R
2
L = 
0.026, Null model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 54.67, Control Model -2LL = 36.75, 
Model -2 LL = 35.81. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely 
restricted sample size; separate analyses indicated it did not significantly predict 







Table 18: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Safety Performance on Objective 
Safety-Related Outcomes 
    Restricted Work Days Missed Work Days 





1 Race 0.003 -0.035 0.004 -0.034 
  Gender   0.019   0.048 
  Age   0.032   0.007 
2 Group Size 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.010 
3 Safety Performance 0.002 0.043 0.001 0.029 
  R
2
 0.005   0.005   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
n = 596 
Note: Tenure was removed because it severely restricted sample size; separate 






Table 19: Logistic Regression of Safety Performance Predicting Likelihood of Micro-
Accidents 





95% CI for Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant 2.182 0.488 -- -- -- -- 
Race 0.194 0.150 1.875 1.214 0.904 1.630 
Gender -0.374 0.241 2.458 0.688 0.430 1.103 
Age -0.018 0.043 0.176 0.982 0.903 1.068 
Group Size -0.660 1.177 0.282 0.517 0.051 5.189 
Safety Performance -0.361 0.220 3.485 0.697 0.453 1.073 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 3.485, df = 1, n = 598, R
2
L = 
0.007 Null model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 499.64, Control Model -2LL = 479.98, 
Final Model -2 LL = 476.50. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it 








Table 20: Logistic Regression of Safety Performance Predicting Likelihood of 
Accidents/Injuries 





95% CI for Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -3.684 0.1656 -- -- -- -- 
Race -0.065 0.0475 1.984 0.937 0.853 1.028 
Gender 0.137 0.0841 2.656 1.147 0.972 1.352 
Age 0.051 0.0143 12.600*** 1.052 1.023 1.082 
Group Size -0.113 0.5098 0.051 0.893 0.329 2.425 
Safety Performance -0.038 0.073 0.491 0.963 0.834 1.111 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.491, df = 1, n = 17,287, R
2
L 
= 0.000 Initial -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 5198.56, Control Model -2LL = 5135.48, Final 
Model -2 LL = 5134.99. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely 







Table 21: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Average Predicting 
Likelihood of Micro-Accidents 
Variables 





95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant 2.531 0.5627 -- -- -- -- 
Race 0.186 0.1623 1.474* 1.204 0.876 1.656 
Gender -0.557 0.281 4.089 0.573 0.330 0.994 
Age -0.029 0.048 0.363 0.971 0.884 1.067 
Group Size -0.823 1.178 0.425 0.439 0.044 4.418 
Safety 
Performance 0.027 
0.186 0.410 1.027 0.713 1.479 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.410, df = 1, n = 
466, R
2
L = 0.001 Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 390.93, Control 
Model -2LL = 367.56, Final Model -2 LL = 367.15. Tenure was removed as a 
control variable because it severely restricted sample size; separate analyses 







Table 22: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Average Predicting Likelihood 
of Accidents/Injuries 
Variables 





95% CI for Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -3.713 0.186 -- -- -- -- 
Race -0.081 0.052 2.570 0.922 0.832 1.021 
Gender 0.190 0.096 3.947* 1.209 1.002 1.459 
Age 0.045 0.016 8.069** 1.046 1.014 1.079 
Group Size -0.062 0.511 0.015 0.940 0.346 2.559 
Safety Climate 
Average 
0.021 0.069 0.160 1.021 0.891 1.170 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.160, df = 1, n = 
13,615, R
2
L = 0.000 Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 4061.12, Control 
Model = 3996.00, Final Model -2 LL = 3995.85. Tenure was removed as a 
control variable because it severely restricted sample size; separate analyses 






Table 23: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Strength Predicting Likelihood of Micro-
Accidents 





95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant 2.420 0.709 -- -- -- -- 
Race 0.189 0.163 1.512 1.208 0.878 1.661 
Gender -0.557 0.281 4.085* 0.573 0.330 0.995 
Age -0.029 0.048 0.355 0.972 0.884 1.068 
Group Size -0.791 1.185 0.391 0.454 0.044 4.623 
Safety Climate Average 0.024 0.188 0.017 1.025 0.709 1.481 
Safety Climate Strength 0.155 0.608 0.014 1.168 0.355 3.845 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.014, df = 1, n = 466, R
2
L = 0.000 
Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 390.83, Control Model = 367.84, Model -2 LL = 367.83. 
Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely restricted sample size; separate 







Table 24: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Strength Predicting Likelihood of 
Accidents/Injuries 





95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -3.664 0.231 -- -- -- -- 
Race -0.081 0.052 2.583 0.922 0.832 1.021 
Gender 0.191 0.096 3.981* 1.210 1.003 1.460 
Age 0.045 0.016 8.062** 1.046 1.014 1.079 
Group Size -0.060 0.511 0.014 0.941 0.346 2.562 
Safety Climate Average 0.021 0.070 0.093 1.021 0.891 1.171 
Safety Climate Strength -0.074 0.208 0.013 0.929 0.618 1.395 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.013 df = 1, n = 13,615, 
R
2
L = 0.016 Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 4061.12, Control Model -2LL = 
3995.92, Final Model -2 LL = 3995.90. Tenure was removed as a control variable 
because it severely restricted sample size; separate analyses indicated it did not 




Table 25: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Average Safety Climate on Subjective Safety-Related Outcomes 












1 Race 0.001 0.017 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.000 0.004 





























0.392*** 0.627*** 0.017 -0.129*** 0.012*** -0.110*** 0.026*** -0.161*** 
  R
2







* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 






Table 26: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Safety Climate Strength on Subjective Safety-Related Outcomes   
    Safety Performance Near-Miss Minor Injuries MSK Pain 









1 Race 0.001 0.017 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.000 0.004 
































0.002*** 0.051*** 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  R
2







* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 












Table 27: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Safety Performance on Subjective Safety-Related 
Outcomes 











1 Race 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.000 0.004 
  Gender   -0.025   -0.014   0.016 
  Age   0.006   -0.028*   -0.005 
  Tenure   0.016   0.018   -0.001 




0.007*** -0.084*** 0.006*** -0.080*** 0.009*** -0.095*** 
  R
2
 0.009   0.008   0.009   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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